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State Action and the Meaning of Agreement

Under the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid
Restraints
tt
t
John E. Lopatka and William H. Page

Antitrust observers arefamiliar with the two-part Midcal test for the
immunity of state regulation from federal antitrust laws. the state must
clearly articulate its policy to displace competition and must "actively
supervise" any private conduct pursuant to the policy. But state action
need not meet these requirements if it is "unilateral" and therefore does
not conflict with Section 1. Only if a state-authorized restraint is
"hybrid," combining state and private action in a way that resembles a
prohibitedagreement, need the restraintsatisfy Midcal.
In this article, John Lopatka and Bill Page examine the history and
current importance of the distinction between unilateral and hybrid
restraints. Although the Supreme Court's precedents are not entirely
consistent, the authors argue that a unilateral restraint is one in which
governmental actors define the extent of consumer harm, while a hybrid
restraint is one in which the government "empowers private actors to
exercise discretion as to the nature or level of consumer injury in a way
They examine the
that closely resembles an antitrust violation. "
emergence of this principle in the context of state restraints that are
analogous to resale price maintenance. They then examine recent
appellate decisions characterizinghorizontal restraintsas hybrid. In this
part, the authors argue that antitrust law reaches "not only state
authorized express collusion but state practices that significantlyfacilitate
tacit collusion and serve no competitively benign purpose. "
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Introduction
Antitrust differs from most forms of economic regulation in its
reliance on sporadic judicial intervention in markets to penalize conduct

that reduces consumer welfare.' Over the past century, the Supreme Court
has developed a complicated set of antitrust categories, prescribing forms
and levels of scrutiny of various practices, based upon their likelihood of
harming consumers by reducing economic efficiency. 2 The Court

formulated these rules to address private practices-those that firms
adopted without governmental support other than the market framework of
contract and property law. But antitrust regulation often applies to markets
that are subject to more continuous and pervasive regulation. Where the

source of this regulation is state or local law, the question is whether
antitrust and state regulation can coexist or whether one must yield to the
other. The Supreme Court has developed yet another intricate body of
doctrines to address this issue and its manifold variations. The most
celebrated part of this doctrine is state action immunity, 3 announced in the
I
On the purpose of antitrust law, see, for example, Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,
506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) ("The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from the
working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market."); Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) ("Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare
prescription."') (citation omitted); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 427 (The Free Press
1993) ("By and large, with some ambiguity at times, the more recent cases have adopted a consumer
welfare model [of antitrust].").
2
See generally Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-71, 779-81 (1999) (discussing
categories of antitrust scrutiny).
3
The terminology used to describe the state action doctrine can be confusing. One court
recently observed: "State-action immunity' is more accurately a strict standard for locating the reach
of the Sherman Act than the judicial creation of a defense to liability for its violation.... Thus, what
has come to be known as 'state-action immunity' is not really immunity but rather an exemption.... It
does, however, function in certain respects much like an immunity." Apani Southwest, Inc. v. CocaCola Ents., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 988, 997 (N.D. Tex. 2001). Justice Rehnquist, however, once
complained about this issue: "I think it quite clear that questions involving the so-called 'state action'
doctrine are more properly framed as being ones of pre-emption rather than exemption." Cmty.
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 62 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Apani
270

HeinOnline -- 20 Yale J. on Reg. 270 2003

State Action and Hybrid Restraints
1943 case of Parker v. Brown 4 and elaborated in numerous decisions since
then.5 That doctrine protects the state from liability for its anticompetitive
acts and protects private parties from liability for actions undertaken
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy and actively supervised by the
state.
But there is another, less prominent, dimension of the Court's
approach to state-supported restraints.6 The Court has rejected some
antitrust challenges to state or local regulations on the grounds that they
did not conflict with antitrust law and were therefore valid regardless of
whether they met the requirements of immunity. State regulation does not
conflict with antitrust law simply because it reduces competition. For a
conflict to exist, the implementation of the regulation must amount to a
violation of the substantive rules of antitrust. For example, in Fisher v.
City of Berkeley,7 the Court held that a municipal rent control scheme,
which all but eliminated price competition, did not conflict with antitrust
law because it "unilaterally" imposed rents on landlords. 8 Because there
was no "contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy," there was no violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and, thus, no need to invoke Parker
immunity. 9 By contrast, in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass 'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,10 a statute requiring distributors to charge resale
prices dictated by their suppliers did conflict with antitrust; the Court
condemned the restraint as tantamount to a per se illegal private resale
price maintenance agreement. The Court has termed the kind of restraint in
Midcal "hybrid," to indicate its inherent admixture of state assistance and
private anticompetitive activity."' Such a restraint is valid only if it meets
the requirements of state action immunity. The Midcal scheme was not
immune, because the state did not actively supervise the prices dictated by
the suppliers.

court relied on Surgical Care Center. L.C. v. tlosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 171 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir.
1999), where the court observed that the label "immunity" is only a "convenient shorthand"
expression. We use the term immunity as a convenient way of referring to the state action doctrine in
general, making no representations about its technical applicability.
4

317 U.S. 341,350-51 (1943).

5
See infra Section I.A.
6
Throughout this Article, unless otherwise specifically indicated, we use the terms "state"
and "government" to denote state and local governmental entities. The doctrine of state action
immunity distinguishes between actions of the state as sovereign and those of subordinate bodies. See
infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. By contrast, no distinction is made between the state and
subordinate governments for purposes of identifying unilateral restraints imposed by government. Of'
course, neither of these doctrines applies to anticompetitive federal actions.
7

475 U.S. 260 (1986).

8

Id. at 270.

9

Id. at 270 ("We therefore need not address whether, even if the controls were to mandate

§ I violations, they would be exempt under the state-action doctrine from antitrust scrutiny.").
10
11

445 U.S. 97, 103 (1980).
Fisher, 475 U.S. at 267-68.
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Thus, the Court's state action jurisprudence recognizes both unilateral
restraints imposed by government, which do not conflict with antitrust, and
hybrid restraints, which do. Hybrid restraints, in turn, may or may not meet
the requirements of state action immunity; the agricultural program in
Parker was immune, but the resale price restraint in Mideal was not. In
cases in which the requirements of immunity are not satisfied, therefore,
the line between hybrid and unilateral restraints may determine the
scheme's antitrust validity. As will become evident in the pages that
follow, this line is extraordinarily elusive.
Although scholars have labored over the nuances of state action
immunity,' 2 they have largely ignored the separate issue of antitrust
conflict.'

3

In this Article, we articulate a method of classifying state-

supported restraints as unilateral or hybrid. We take as a jumping off point
the statements of the Supreme Court. But the Court's guidance has been
sparse. The full Court has only explicitly relied on the doctrine in one case,
Fisher, and its teaching there was cryptic. Indeed, the Court seemed to
discover the idea of a unilateral restraint rather late in its jurisprudence of
state-supported anticompetitive actions; curiously, lower courts and
litigants have often simply overlooked the doctrine. As a result, no
principle has emerged full-blown from the cases. In any event, our
objective is not to distill the doctrine from Supreme Court precedents on
12
See. e.g., Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95
HARV. L. REV. 435 (1981); John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action'"
Antitrust Cases, 61 TEX. L. REV. 481 (1982); Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism,26 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1983); Einer R. Elhauge, The Scope ofAntitrust Process, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 667 (1991); Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the
Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987); Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust State-Action Doctrine
After Fisher v. Berkeley, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1257 (1986); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Making Sense ofthe Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic
Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1997); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and
the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227
(1987); John E. Lopatka, State Action and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53
FORDiiAM L. REV. 23 (1984) [hereinafter Lopatka, Municipal Inmunity]; John E. Lopatka, The State of
"State Action" Antitrust Immunity: A Progress Report, 46 LA. L. REV. 941 (1986) [hereinafter
Lopatka, Progress Report]; William 1-. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A
Reconstruction and Critique ofthe State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV.
1099 (1981) [hereinafter Page, Federalisni]; William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State
Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Econoiic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618 [hereinafter
Page, Interest Groups]; William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of
Antitrust: FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 189, 191-92 (1993); Steven
Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203 (2000);
Matthew Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture
Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1988); John Shephard Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust
Federalisn, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1986).
13
For brief treatments of the topic, see, for example, I PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,
217b2-217d, at 306-19 (2d ed. 2000); Garland, supra note 12, at
502-08; Lopatka, Progress Report, supra note 12, at 1030-37; Page, Interest Groups, supra note 12, at
661-64. As a review of our previous articles would demonstrate, our own views on the issue have
evolved.

272
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the issue but to derive a sound doctrine from the substantive principles of
antitrust law and the concerns that underlie the protection of state action
from antitrust scrutiny.
We argue here that a unilateral governmental restraint is one in which
public officials determine the nature and extent of the resulting consumer
injury, even though the decision is effectuated through the actions of
private parties in compliance with the government's mandates. A hybrid
restraint, by contrast, is one in which the government specifically
empowers private actors to exercise discretion as to the nature or level of
consumer injury in a way that closely resembles an antitrust violation. The
ingredients of a hybrid restraint, therefore, are focused government
intervention, private discretion, and conduct analogous to a recognized
antitrust offense. Determining whether a restraint is analogous to an
antitrust offense requires an examination of the underlying goals of the
relevant antitrust rules, which were designed to address private restraints,
as well as the idiosyncrasies of the government action at issue. If state
sponsorship implements or facilitates private discretion in a way that
mimics a private restraint, the restraint is hybrid, and it must meet the
requirements of state action immunity in order to avoid condemnation.
The tension between antitrust and state regulation does not end with a
determination that a restraint is hybrid and not immune. It extends to the
issue of antitrust remedies. A facially invalid government directive can be
preempted in the abstract, implying that government officials cannot
enforce it and private parties need not obey it. Non-immune hybrid
restraints invalid only in particular circumstances need to be addressed
through tailored injunctions, which may include an order from an antitrust
court prohibiting a party from complying with a government mandate. We
explain below that antitrust courts have the constitutional power to fashion
injunctions that bind state actors and those subject to state control. But the
assertion of federal power over state policy in the guise of a prospective
antitrust remedy produces an undeniable tension. In addition, antitrust
relief may include an award of treble damages for past harm. States and
subordinate governments are shielded from damage liability, but private
parties participating in hybrid restraints are not. The consequence is that a
private party can incur treble damage liability for complying with a
government directive. Again, the limits of federalism are tested.
In the next section, we locate the Supreme Court's hybrid restraint
doctrine in relation to the state action antitrust immunity. We then set out
our theory of a unified doctrine that separates state-supported
arrangements that conflict with the antitrust laws from those that do not.
Next, we examine state-mandated distributional restraints. We show how
the Court has applied the rule against private resale price maintenance by
somewhat strained analogy to state-endorsed restraints on distribution. We
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dwell particularly on the peculiarities in the Court's use of the idea of
agreement. We then consider the application of the hybrid restraint
concept to horizontal restraints, arguing that it reaches not only state
authorized express collusion but state practices that significantly facilitate
tacit collusion and serve no competitively benign purpose. We discuss in
detail two important decisions of the courts of appeals that have reached
this result. Finally, we address the application of our theory to statecreated monopolies, demonstrating that unilateral governmental restraints
granting monopolies to private firms generally do not violate Sections 1 or
2 of the Sherman Act.
1.

Background: State Action Immunity and Hybrid Restraints

We have elsewhere examined in detail the Supreme Court's doctrines
reconciling antitrust and state regulation.14 Here, we merely sketch the
development of these doctrines in order to lay the groundwork for a more
detailed exploration of the concept of hybrid restraints.
A.

State Action Immunity

In Parker v. Brown,'5 the Supreme Court refused to condemn a6
California regulatory scheme that allowed raisin growers to fix prices.'
The Court grounded its decision on federalism: "In a dual system of
government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save
only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an
unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents
is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."' 7 It reasoned that if Congress
had wanted to apply the Sherman Act to sovereign states, it would have

14
See Lopatka, Municipal Immunity, supra note 12; Lopatka, Progress Report, supra note
12; Page, Federalism, supra note 12; Page, Interest Groups, supra note 12; Page & Lopatka, supra

note 12, at 191-92.
15
317 U.S. 341 (1943). The antecedent of the doctrine is Olson v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332
(1904), where the Court held that a state regulatory scheme limiting entry into and fixing rates in a
marine pilot market was not preempted by the Sherman Act.
16
Although the Court clearly rejected the antitrust claim, precisely what the Court held is a
matter of some dispute. Justice Stevens argued that the Court held merely that state officials, acting

pursuant to express legislative command, do not violate the Sherman Act by engaging in conduct that
would violate the Act if undertaken by private parties. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579,
589-90 (1976) (plurality opinion). But Justice Stewart contended that the Court held that the Califomia
statute was not preempted by the Sherman Act, so that presumably no parties effecting the restraint,
whether public or private, can be found to have committed an antitrust violation. Id. at 621-22

(Stewart, J., dissenting). The Court ultimately endorsed Justice Stewart's interpretation. See S. Motor
Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 57 (1985) (citing Justice Stewart's dissenting
opinion in Cantor and declining "to reduce Parker's holding to a formalism that would stand for little
more than the proposition that Porter Brown sued the wrong parties").
17
Parker, 317U.S. at351.
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expressed that intent more clearly.' 8 Yet the Court did not hold that

federalism shelters all state-sponsored anticompetitive conduct from the
antitrust laws. It observed, for example, that "a state does not give
immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to
violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful."' 9 The Court,
therefore, recognized the possibility that federal antitrust law would trump

some state-supported restraints, but its guidance was minimal.
In later decisions, the Court clarified the reach of the state action
immunity. It held that anticompetitive actions attributable to sovereign
state actors are automatically immune from the antitrust laws. 20 But
2
critically for present purposes, the Court held that municipalities, '

agencies composed of members of the profession they regulate, 22 and
independent state regulatory agencies 2' do not constitute the state as
sovereign.24 This latter cluster of decisions proved important to the
emergence of the unilateral restraints doctrine. If acts of subordinate
government units had been held automatically immune from antitrust

exposure under the state action doctrine, an inquiry into whether a restraint
escaped antitrust condemnation as one unilaterally imposed by government
would have been largely superfluous: the validity of restraints adopted by

these entities that contemplated private decision-making could have been
assessed exclusively under the standards of Midcal.
In Midcal, the Court held that private parties are entitled to state
action immunity when two requirements are satisfied: "First, the
challenged restraint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively
18
19

Id.
Id.

20

See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.

350, 361 (1977).
21
City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412-13 (1978).
22
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
23
S. Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 63 (1985) . The issue
before the Court was whether the agency could itself effectively authorize private parties to engage in a
restraint or, in other words, the first prong of the Midcal test-"the challenged restraint must be one
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy," Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the
determination of what constitutes the state for purposes of the antitrust status of its own restraint is
identical to the determination of what constitutes the state for purposes of authorizing a private
restraint.
24
At a minimum, a state legislature, when acting with the concurrence of the governor, is a
sovereign actor. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 567-68 (observing that "when a state legislature adopts
legislation," with the constitutionally required assent of the governor, "its actions constitute those of
the State"). A state supreme court, when acting legislatively rather than judicially, is the state itself for
purposes of an automatic antitrust exemption. See id. at 568; Bates, 433 U.S. at 360. The Court did not
explain why it ostensibly limited automatic immunity to the legislative acts of a supreme court, The
Court explicitly declined to decide "whether the Governor of a State stands in the same position as the
state legislature and supreme court for purposes of the state-action doctrine." -oover, 466 U.S. at 568
n.17. A district court has held that the governor is indeed a sovereign actor. See Astoria Entr't, Inc. v.
Edwards, 159 F. Supp. 2d 303, 324 (E.D. La. 2001).

HeinOnline -- 20 Yale J. on Reg. 275 2003

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 20:269, 2003

expressed as state policy; second, the policy must be actively supervised
by the State itself."25 The implication is that a sovereign state actor-one
that would enjoy automatic immunity for its own anticompetitive
conduct-must express the policy. Immunity does not require that the state
compel the actions of the private party; a permissive policy is enough.26
Further, the policy, whether mandatory or permissive, need not in fact be
as "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" as the Midcal
formulation suggests. 27 The Court held that it is sufficient if
"anticompetitive effects logically would result from"28 or "foreseeably will
result" from state pronouncements. 29 As for supervision, the Court held
that active indeed means active. The state must exercise "sufficient
independent judgment and control" to demonstrate "that the details of the
rates or prices have been established as a product of deliberate
state
30
intervention, not simply by agreement among private parties.
The Court also held that, though subordinate state bodies are not
sovereign actors entitled to automatic immunity, they are not private actors
subject to both prongs of the Midcal test either. Rather, municipalities and
independent agencies need only satisfy the first prong of Midcal: They
must act pursuant to a clear state policy, but their actions need not be
actively supervised." Further, a grant of home rule power to a city does
not satisfy the clear state policy prong of Midcal.3 2 This latter decision
implied that a subordinate body could not effectively become the
sovereign for state action purposes, thereby largely eliminating a role for a
25
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted). Whatever
uncertainty remained as to whether state action immunity includes private parties was put to rest in
Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 57 ("Parker immunity is available to private parties .....
26
Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 60.
27
As one court observed, "the 'clear articulation' label is not quite the hurdle that its
language suggests, because it has always been construed as synonymous with the foreseeability test."
Automated Salvage Transp., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 59, 69 (2d Cir. 1998).
28
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985).
29
Id. at 43. In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991),
the Court found that "[i]t is enough ... if suppression of competition is the 'foreseeable result' of what
thc statute authorizes." Finding that a statute authorizing cities to regulate the location and size of
structures through zoning ordinances was sufficiently specific to immunize an allegedly
anticompetitive regulation of billboards, the Court indicated that rather general authorization suffices.
It rejected the dissent's contention that, for immunity, the state must "expressly authorize the
municipality to engage (I) in specifically 'economic regulation' (2) of a specific industry," declaring
that the "dual specificities are without support in our precedents, for the good reason that they defy
rational interpretation." Id. at 373 n.4 (citations omitted).
30
FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634-35 (1992). In Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S.
94, 101 (1988), the Court explained that the state must "exercise ultimate control over the challenged
anticompetitive conduct." State officials must "have and exercise power to review particular
anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy." Id.
31
Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46-47. The case involved a city, and the Court held that the
active supervision requirement does not apply to such an entity. In dicta, it noted that "[i]n cases in
which the state actor is a state agency, it is likely that active supervision would also not be required,
although we do not here decide that issue." Id. at 46 n. 10.
32
Cmty. Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54-56 (1982).
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separate unilateral restraint doctrine, through the simple expedient of a
very broad delegation of power.
Oddly, the Court has never explained why federalism dictates the
specific form of the doctrine that has taken shape over the years. 33 We have
argued that the unspoken principle animating the doctrine is that antitrust
should defer to state restraints that are ancillary to some positive regulatory
program but not to naked repeals of federal statutory requirements.34 A
state may restrict competitive behavior in order to correct a market failure;
if the failure is real, it is pursuing a policy congruent with antitrust policy.
In such a case, there is no conflict between the objective of the antitrust law
and the objective of the state program; consumer welfare in such an
instance is ill-served through the process that normally protects consumers.
But a state may also sacrifice the interests of consumers in order to serve
some interest it deems more important. 35 Whatever the reason for state
intervention in the market, so long as the state itself takes the operative
action or both adopts its policy clearly and actively supervises private
conduct to assure that the policy is implemented, the federal antitrust laws
are inapplicable. A simple suspension of antitrust strictures without
adequate state supervision, however, reflects a naked repeal of antitrust. It
negates federal policy without substituting any coherent alternative policy,
and it is vulnerable to antitrust attack unless it enjoys some separate federal
protection, such as that provided by the Twenty-first Amendment.
B.

Unilateraland Hybrid Restraints in the Supreme Court

While the Court was refining the principle behind the Parker doctrine,
it held that even a governmental restraint that would not be immune under
the doctrine just outlined might nevertheless be valid if it does not conflict
with substantive antitrust prohibitions. The Court first relied on the notion
that a unilateral government restraint simply does not conflict with Section36
I of the Sherman Act in the 1986 case of Fisher v. City of Berkeley,
though it found rudimentary antecedents of the idea in several earlier cases
and returned to the doctrine a year later in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy.37 But
33
The tension between the regulatory goals of states and the purpose of national antitrust
policy is manifest, and obviously more than one resolution is possible. Richard Posner has observed,
"A situation in which the benefits of government action are concentrated in one state and the costs in
other states is a recipe for irresponsible state action. This is a genuine downside of federalism. The
federal government ... is ...

less subject to take-over by a faction. I am not myself inclined to make a

fetish of federalism." RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 281 (2d ed. 2001).
34
See Page & Lopatka, supra note 12, at 191-92.
35
As the Court once observed, "[T]he function of government may often be to tamper with
free markets, correcting their failures and aiding their victims .
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475
U.S. 260, 264 (1986).
36
Id.
37
479 U.S. 335 (1987).
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in none of these cases did the Court lay out a coherent rationale that could
guide the application of the doctrine to the myriad situations in which
government and private conduct interact to produce anticompetitive results.
Some of the discussion was misleading. But more important, the decisions
tended to be highly specific to the peculiar restraint at issue. The Court
declared that a particular restraint in the context of a specific regulatory
regime was or was not a unilateral restraint but failed to articulate a
principle of "concerted action" addressed generally to the unique nature of
the interaction between the state and those subject to its control.
In Fisher, the city had adopted an ordinance freezing rents and
creating a Rent Stabilization Board to make annual adjustments in rent
levels. The Court might have decided Fisher on state action grounds,38 as
it had decided three earlier antitrust challenges to city regulatory
programs.39 Instead, the Court declined to reach the issue of immunity,40
holding instead that the ordinance did not conflict with the antitrust laws
because- the rent control mechanism did not involve the element of
agreement required by Section 1:41 "[T]he rent ceilings imposed by the
38
It could have held, for example, that the Berkeley ordinance was clearly authorized by
state law and that active supervision was not required, either because the restraint was the ordinance
itself as opposed to the actions of property owners in compliance with it or because the restraint was
self-enforcing. Justice Powell concurred in the decision essentially on this basis, though he did not
discuss the supervision issue at all. See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 273-74 (Powell, J., concurring). Or it could
have held that the ordinance did not satisfy the clear state policy requirement because the rent control
measures were not the foreseeable result of any statutory obligations. Justice Brennan dissented from
the decision on this ground. See id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 392-94 (1978), the
Court held that the city was not automatically immune from antitrust liability by virtue of its status as a
city for alleged anticompetitive actions directed against a competing electric utility. In Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 47-48 (1982), the Court refused to find immunity
for an emergency ordinance enacted under the city's home rule power to prohibit temporarily the
expansion of a cable television company's service area. Finally, in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 44, 47 (1985), the Court found that the city's decision to condition the use of its
sewage collection and transportation services on the use of its sewage treatment'services was immune
because the action was clearly authorized by state law and a city is not subject to the active supervision
requirement.
40
See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 270.
41
/d. The plaintiff landlords alleged that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was
pre-empted by the federal antitrust laws, not that the city had violated those laws. A state or local law
can be pre-empted in the abstract, but only if it "mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily
constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a private
party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute." Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,
458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982). In other words, pre-emption is appropriate only if "the conduct
contemplated by the statute is in all cases aperse violation" of the antitrust laws. Id. A law authorizing
per se illegal conduct may nevertheless "be saved from invalidation under the doctrine of Parker v.
Brown," id. at 662 n.9, presumably by providing for active supervision of the private conduct. And in
operation, the arrangements private parties make with each other "will be subject to Sherman Act
analysis under the rule of reason," id. at 662, so those private actors apparently could be held liable for
antitrust violations unless their conduct is protected by the state action doctrine. Thus, whether a
restraint is challenged as unconstitutional, and therefore pre-empted, or those involved in the restraint
are alleged to have violated the antitrust laws, the issue of whether the restraint involves concerted
action is the same.

HeinOnline -- 20 Yale J. on Reg. 278 2003

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 20:269, 2003

[A] state statute, when considered in the abstract, may be condemned
under the antitrust laws only if it mandates, or authorizes conduct that
necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it
places irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws
in order to comply with the statute. 5'
Thus, a state law could facially conflict with antitrust only if it authorized
or mandated a per se violation, a label reserved for practices, such as price
fixing, that the law condemns "without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."52 Because the
statute in Rice only restored the distiller's ability to limit the distribution of
its product in California through a vertical nonprice restraint, which would
be judged under the rule of reason in any event, the statute was not invalid
on its face, and the legality of private conduct under its terms would be
determined on a case-by-case basis. 53 Indeed, the Court noted the
possibility that "particular conduct pursuant to the statute might be subject
to a challenge under one or more of the established per se rules of
54
illegality,"
even though the statute could not be condemned in the
55
abstract.
The Court analogized the case to Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hostetter,56 which also refused to find facially invalid a state regulation of
liquor distribution. The regulation at issue in Hostetter required
distributors to file price schedules with the State Liquor Authority along
with an "affirmation" that prices listed were as low as prices charged
anywhere else in the United States.57 That regulation, according to the Rice
Court, merely required the collection of price information to "support" the
most-favored-nation affirmations and, as such, did not place "irresistible
economic pressure" on distributors to violate Section 1; indeed, the
regulation depended upon Section 1 to prevent conspiracies to raise the
prices on which the affirmations were based. But the Court did not call the
schemes in Rice or Hostetter hybrid restraints.
51
Id. at 661.
52
N. Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5 (1958).
53
See Rice, 458 U.S. at 662 ("The manner in which a distiller utilizes the designation
statute and the arrangements a distiller makes with its wholesalers will be subject to Sherman Act
analysis under the rule of reason.").
54
Id. at 662 n.8. The Court must have been using the term "pursuant to" in a very loose
sense. If a statute authorized, though did not compel, per se illegal behavior, it would be subject to
facial pre-emption. The Court apparently has in mind per se illegal conduct that is not prohibited by
the statute. To say that such conduct is "pursuant to" the statute isa linguistic stretch.
55
The Court also recognized that, because the facial antitrust challenge to the statue failed,
"it is not necessary for us to consider whether the statute may be saved from invalidation under the
doctrine of Parker v. Brown." Id. at 662 n.9.
56
384 U.S. 35 (1966).
57
Id. at 39-40.
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Ordinance and maintained by the Rent Stabilization Board have been
unilaterally imposed by government upon landlords to the exclusion of
private control." 42 The Court explained that neither a vertical nor a
horizontal conspiracy arises when a governmental entity prescribes
specific, uniform behavior and private competitors comply. Landlords who
comply with "a restraint imposed unilaterally by govemrnment" because of
the law's "coercive effect" do not form individual agreements with the
government, nor do they form a "conspiracy" among themselves: "There is
no meeting of the minds here. 43
But borrowing a term coined by Justice Stevens in Rice v. Norman
Williams Co.,44 the Court distinguished this sort of restraint from "hybrid"
restraints, those in which "nonmarket mechanisms merely enforce private
marketing decisions,, 45 so that "private actors are thus granted a degree of
private regulatory power. 4 6 For example, in two prior cases-Midcal and
Schwegmann-the Court had condemned state statutes that mandated
compliance with resale prices set by suppliers. These restraints, according
to the FisherCourt, involved a significant "degree of free participation by
private economic actors ' 47' and were therefore "quite different from the
pure regulatory scheme imposed by Berkeley's Ordinance., 48 They did
satisfy the concerted action requirement of Section 1 and, thus, came into
conflict with antitrust's prohibition of resale price maintenance.4 9 We
examine some hidden complexities in this characterization more fully in
the next section but shelve those questions temporarily in order to explore
the history of the Court's use of the hybrid restraints concept.
Because Rice was the origin of the critical term "hybrid restraint," it
warrants close attention. The Court there upheld against a facial attack
California's "designation" statute, which prohibited any state-licensed
liquor dealer from importing a brand of liquor unless the distiller of that
brand had specifically authorized the dealer to do so. The statute was
enacted in response to Oklahoma's liquor laws, which were understood to
prohibit a distiller from limiting its sales to selected Oklahoma
wholesalers.50 As a result, a distiller's normal ability to control the
distribution of its product in California was thwarted, because a California
wholesaler could obtain the liquor from an Oklahoma wholesaler. The
majority in Rice announced the principle that:
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Fisher, 475 U.S. at 266.
Id.at 267.
458 U.S. 654, 665 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
Fisher, 475 U.S. at 268.
Id. at 268 (citing Rice, 458 U.S. at 665 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Id.at 268.
Id.at 269.
Id.
Rice, 458 U.S. at 657.
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In his concurrence, however, Justice Stevens did characterize the
statute in Rice as a hybrid restraint, because it "contemplates a private
market decision but provides a nonmarket mechanism for enforcing the
decision."' 8 He thus distinguished the restraint both from a "public
regulatory scheme," such as a statute prohibiting oil companies from
operating service stations in the state, 59 and from a "purely private
60
restraint," such as an ordinary resale price maintenance agreement.
Presaging the Court's analysis in Fisher,he identified two earlier cases as
involving hybrid restraints. In the first, Schwegrnann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp.,6' a state statute provided that an agreement on resale
prices between a liquor supplier and a retailer would bind all other
retailers, even if they did not sign a resale price agreement. At the time,
simple resale price maintenance agreements permitted by a state were
lawful under the Miller-Tydings Act. But the Court held invalid the nonsigner provision, by which distillers were able to command dealers to
comply with terms established in contracts with nonsigners. Schwegmann,
according to Justice Stevens in Rice, stands for the proposition that:
[A] state statute that facilitates the manufacturer's decision to impose a
vertical restriction is not lawful simply because the Sherman Act permits
the manufacturer, if it has sufficient power in the private market, to
impose that same restriction without the aid of the statute. In other words,
a statute that gives distributors additional power over the wholesale or
retail market to impose an otherwise permissible restraint might not pass
muster under the Sherman Act.62
Justice Stevens' other example of a hybrid restraint was Midcal, which

struck down statutes that permitted wine suppliers to set resale prices of all
wholesalers within each trading area. Stevens observed that "[e]ven though
the State presumably could regulate the wine market by fixing retail prices
itself, it could not empower private parties to undertake such regulation. 6 3
By contrast, the statute in Hostetter, he opined, was not an example of a
hybrid restraint but rather of a public regulatory scheme, because64 "it did
not grant liquor distributors a degree of private regulatory power.,

58
Rice, 458 U.S. at 665. Justice Stevens's description of a "hybrid" restraint was
reminiscent of his observation in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592 (1976), that
restraints involving the government are typically "a blend of private and public decisionmaking."
59
See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
60
See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
61
341 U.S. 384 (1951).
62
Rice, 458 U.S. at 667.
63
Id. at 667 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64
Id. at 665,666 n.I.

HeinOnline -- 20 Yale J. on Reg. 281 2003

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 20:269, 2003

Turning to the designation statute at issue in Rice, Stevens disagreed
with the majority's assertion that the California statute merely restored a
distiller's power to control distribution that was taken away by the
Oklahoma laws because the statute might confer more power on the
distiller than the Oklahoma law eliminated.65 But he agreed with the
majority that, on the record before the Court, the statute could not be
condemned on its face, because it involved only a vertical nonprice
restraint. 66 He maintained that the case should be remanded to determine
"whether the statute's provision to distillers of an additional club over
California importers affords distillers an unreasonable degree of
unsupervised power to regulate their distribution practices that they would
not otherwise enjoy under a free market., 67 Apparently Justice Stevens
would have been willing to hold the statute facially invalid if the record
demonstrated that the statute, though contemplating only vertical nonprice
restraints, created "an
unacceptable and unnecessary risk of
6
anticompetitive effect.,

1

Justice Stevens's definition of a hybrid restraint as one in which a
"nonmarket mechanism" enforces a private market decision typifies the
ambiguities in the Court's pronouncements on the issue.69 If he meant his
definition to be comprehensive, it falls short. By "nonmarket mechanism,"
Justice Stevens apparently had in mind something other than the legal
70
enforcement of contracts, because he cited as a "purely private restraint"
the non-price distribution agreement at issue in Continental T V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc."1 But the hybrid character of a restraint turns on the
nature of the underlying arrangement, not on the kind of sanctions a state
specifies for enforcing it. If, for example, a state legislature or even a state
supreme court were to declare that price fixing agreements are judicially
enforceable, the result would surely be a hybrid restraint.
Alluding to Justices Stevens's distinctions, the Fishermajority, which
included Stevens, characterized Schwegmann and Midcal as hybrid
restraint cases, because the statutes provided governmental enforcement of
privately established prices. In Fisher itself, in contrast, government actors
fixed the prices and compelled private actors to comply. The Berkeley
ordinance was not a hybrid restraint because "it place[d] complete control
over maximum rent levels exclusively in the hands of the Rent
Stabilization Board. Not just the controls themselves but also the rent
ceilings they mandate [had] been unilaterally imposed on the landlords by
65

Id. at 667-68.

66
67
68
69
70

1d. at 668.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 668.
See id. at 665, 668.
1(1.at 665-66.

71

433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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the city."'72 The involvement of the government at the stage of price-setting
73
rendered the restraint one unilaterally imposed by government, or
apparently what Stevens would term a purely public regulatory scheme.
The year after deciding Fisher, the Court in 324 Liquor Corp. v.
Duffy 4 condemned as hybrid a liquor regulatory scheme that required
liquor wholesalers to post price schedules and retailers to charge at least
112% of the wholesale prices posted at the time of retail sale. But the law
allowed wholesalers to compel retailers to charge more than 112% of their
wholesale cost, either by charging actual wholesale prices below posted
prices or by selling large quantities of liquor and then raising posted
wholesale prices before all of the liquor could be sold at retail.7 5 The Court
explicitly found that the scheme was a hybrid restraint because it granted
private actors "a degree of private regulatory power. ' 0 6 Moreover, it was
not entitled to state action immunity because the state did not actively
supervise the prices. 7
To summarize, the Court distinguishes among restraints unilaterally
imposed by government, hybrid restraints, and private restraints. As we
explain in more detail below, a restraint moves from the category of

72
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 269 (1986).
73
Justice Brennan countered that "the lack of state supervision over price-fixing activities
[in Schwegmann and Midcal] was only relevant to whether the challenged statutes were immune from
antitrust liability under Parker v. Brown." Fisher, 475 U.S. at 277 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). He noted that neither decision drew a distinction between "unilateral" and "hybrid"
restraints and concluded that "regardless of whether Berkeley's landlords have some role in setting the
prices they must charge, the coercive effect of the city's Ordinance results in concerted action violative
of the Sherman Act." Id.
74
479 U.S. 335 (1987).
75
Id. at 339-40. The enforcement agency allowed wholesalers to sell liquor by the case at a
discount. As a result, the actual wholesale price per bottle could be lower than the posted bottle price.
The retailer was required to charge 112% of the posted bottle price, so that the margin between actual
wholesale cost and retail price could be greater than 12%, based on the discretion of the wholesaler in
determining the amount of the case discount.
76
Id. at 345 n.8 (quoting Fisher, 475 U.S. at 268).
77
Id. at 344. Although the Fisher Court held that a unilateral government restraint cannot
run afoul of Section 1, it also suggested in passing that an ostensibly unilateral restraint might be a
hybrid one in disguise: "There may be cases in which what appears to be a state- or municipalityadministered price stabilization scheme is really a private price-fixing conspiracy, concealed under a
'gauzy cloak of state involvement."' Fisher, 475 U.S. at 269. But what the Court meant is opaque. The
Court went on to suggest that it had in mind a restraint disguised through corruption, noting,
"However, we have been given no indication that such corruption has tainted the rent controls imposed
by Berkeley's Ordinance." Id. (emphasis added). If this is what the Court meant, its teaching was
undercut some years later in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374
(1991), where the Court held that public corruption would not create a conspiracy between the city and
the private firm sufficient to abrogate state action immunity. But the Fisher passage may mean that a
court is entitled to scrutinize the degree of government involvement in the process of formulating a
requirement in determining the character of the restraint. For example, if a Rent Stabilization Board
did not actually review prices collusively established by landlords, and simply ratified and enforced
them, the antitrust court might refuse to find the action unilateral. This principle would be similar to
the Court's holding in FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635, 638 (1992), that mere nominal
review of private conduct is insufficient to satisfy the active supervision requirement of state action
immunity.
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unilateral to hybrid restraint when private participation in a statesponsored decision-making process crosses some critical threshold of
similarity to established antitrust prohibitions. So understood, Justice
Stevens's suggestion in Rice that the distinction is between hybrid
restraints and "public regulation of the market" 78 is misleading; even the
Court in Fisher, though it emphasizes our preferred language of unilateral
restraints, at one point uses the term "pure regulatory scheme" as a
synonym. 79 The reference to "regulation" seems to imply that a scheme
under which private parties are allowed to fix prices under the supervision
of the state-for example, the kind of system at issue in Parker-isnot a
hybrid restraint. And yet private participation in the decision-making
process in such a case is undeniably sufficient to classify the resulting
restraint as hybrid; the supervision of private conduct in Parker helped
confer immunity on the arrangement but did not alter its status as a hybrid
restraint.8 ° Under this view, a similarity between unilateral and immune
hybrid restraints becomes more apparent. If a restraint is unilateral, the
state or local government excludes private discretion entirely; if it is
hybrid and immune, there may be private discretion, but it is subject to ex
post state supervision.
Finally, the Court's analysis implies the existence of a private
restraint, one in which the government's participation is insignificant for
purposes of the concerted action requirement of Section 1, but even this
term can be misunderstood. At an elemental level, government
involvement is necessary for any restraint of trade. The government
creates property rights, enforces contracts, and gives legal identity to
corporations. 8 The Court could not have meant that governmental actions
such as these suffice to make the government a party to concerted action
whenever private actors rely upon the legal framework of the economy to
accomplish an anticompetitive result. If these actions were sufficient, the
category of hybrid restraints would be residual, containing any restraint
that is not unilateral. Yet the Fisher Court was careful to limit the concept
of a hybrid restraint. Indeed, Justice Stevens explicitly recognized a
78
Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 665 n. 1 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
79
Fisher, 475 U.S. at 269.
80
The alternative to this typology is one that recognizes four categories of restraintsprivate, hybrid, unilateral, and regulatory. But the antitrust significance of hybrid and regulatory
restraints would be identical, and so the four-category typology would be needlessly complicated.
81
An analogous issue arose in Northern Securities. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1904). Railroads merging through the device of a holding company defended an antitrust attack in part
on the ground that the holding company was not prohibited from acquiring the stock of the railroads by

its charter, which was issued pursuant to state law. The federal government, the railroads contended,
was forbidden by the Tenth Amendment from invading the rights of the states by prohibiting an act
that was permissible under the state charter. The Court responded, "We cannot conceive how it is
possible for anyone to seriously contend for such a proposition." 1d. at 345. Similarly, the fact that the
state created the legal entity of a corporation with the power to acquire stock did not make the state an
accomplice in the corporation's anticompetitive acquisition.
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category of "purely private restraint[s]. '' 2 In a private restraint, therefore,
the government does no more than to establish the preconditions for trade.
I.

A Unified Theory of Hybrid Restraints

The foregoing sketch of Supreme Court law serves to highlight the
problem of reconciling state economic regulation and the federal antitrust
laws but not to resolve it. To be sure, certain principles emerge clearly. For
example, as a matter of federalism, state regulation that represents a
positive policy choice, rather than a naked repudiation of antitrust, is
immune from antitrust attack regardless of its effect on consumers. But
state regulation that does not conflict with the antitrust laws avoids
condemnation whether or not it qualifies for state action immunity.
Because a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires concerted
action, a "unilateral" restraint of trade, whether state-supported or not,
does not conflict with the statute. Compliance with a specific state
mandate never creates an agreement between the government and the
complying party. And the requisite agreement is not formed simply
because multiple private parties comply with the same specific mandate,
even if compliance has anticompetitive effects.
These principles, however, which have been announced piecemeal, do
not provide an overarching theory to harmonize federal antitrust law and
state economic regulation. They do not connect the idea of antitrust
immunity for state action to the concept of antitrust indifference to
restraints unilaterally imposed by government, even though both involve
deliberate state intervention in the economy. They do not provide a
coherent rationale to identify hybrid, and hence conflicting, restraints of
trade across the wide spectrum of contexts in which the state and private
parties interact. We attempt to offer that theory here, making no pretense
that it is consistent with every judicial pronouncement on the issue. Rather,
our theory springs from first principles of antitrust and state action
immunity and is consistent with the most important and thoughtful
opinions on the subject.
The doctrine of unilateral governmental restraints protects
government regulation that neither enforces nor specifically facilitates
private anticompetitive choices.8 3 The antitrust laws were directed against
concurring).
82
Rice, 458 U.S. at 665-66 (Stevens, J.,
83
The state may choose to adopt an anticompetitive policy suggested by private parties
without creating a hybrid restraint. As long as the implementation of the restraint does not involve
government support of anticompetitive private decisions made after the policy is adopted, the restraint
is unilateral. And the private request for the anticompetitive state policy is separately protected from
antitrust liability by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); see also
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991). In general, the Aoerr-
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the anticompetitive conduct of private market participants, not the exercise
of coercive power by state and local governments that itself has
anticompetitive consequences. Just as the "Sherman Act ... gives no hint
that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a
state, ''84 it gives no hint that it was intended to restrain any unilateral
government exercise of coercive power that injures consumers.8 5 A
unilateral governmental restraint, therefore, is one in which public officials
determine the nature and extent of the consumer injury, even though the
decision is effectuated through the actions of private parties in compliance
with the government's mandates. These restraints need not be justified
through the tests of state action immunity because they do not
fundamentally conflict with antitrust. Tests developed to assure adequate
controls on practices that do conflict with it are irrelevant. Thus, it does
not matter whether the government is a sovereign actor or a subordinate
body, and it does not matter whether the subordinate body has been
specifically authorized by the sovereign to take the challenged action.86
By contrast, a hybrid restraint is one in which the government
empowers a private firm or firms to make choices, or to exercise
discretion, 87 as to the nature or level of consumer injury. As the Court put
it, the government in a hybrid restraint cedes to private actors "a degree of
private regulatory power" 88 that results in a restraint of trade. 89 A
Pennington doctrine is a corollary to Parker. It would bc "obviously peculiar in a democracy, and
perhaps in derogation of the constitutional right 'to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances,' to establish a category of lawful state action that citizens are not permitted to urge." 1(. at
370 (citation omitted). The Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides that the "federal antitrust laws . . . do
not regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government."
Id. at 379-80. Thus, it protects private combinations to obtain anticompetitive action from a
governmental entity even if the entity refuses to take the action. Private actors, therefore, could be
entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity but not state action immunity.
84
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
85
In a similar vein, the Court has held that a unilateral action of state government does not
impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce merely because it injures consumers. See
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 128 (1978).
86
Of course, it also does not matter whether private parties are actively supervised by the
state. But when government action is properly classified as unilateral, the purpose of the supervision
requirement would be fulfilled in any event. The lact that the relevant anticompetitive choices were
made by the government would mean that supervision of private conduct is unnecessary.
87
See generally Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) ("[C]onduct cannot
be discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or choice.").
88
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 268 (1986) (citing Rice v. Norman Williams
Co., 458 U.S. 654, 666 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
89
In a footnote in Duffy, the Court wrote that a "simple 'minimum markup' statute
requiring retailers to charge 112 percent of their actual wholesale cost may satisfy the 'active
supervision' requirement, and so be exempt from the antitrust laws under Parker v. Brown." 324
Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344 n.6 (1987). Under our interpretation of Fisher, such a statute
would involve a restraint unilaterally imposed by government, and so it would be beyond the reach of
Section I without consideration of the state action doctrine. Most likely, the Court did not consider this
basis for avoiding condemnation of the hypothetical statute. Some courts have suggested that, under
the Midcal test, certain restraints are self-policing, so that the active supervision requirement is
satisfied without continuing oversight. See, e.g., Morgan v. Div. of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353, 355
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necessary condition for a hybrid restraint, therefore, is private discretion in
the decision-making process that results in the anticompetitive effect. It is
not a sufficient condition, however, for two reasons. First, private
discretion is the hallmark of a private as well as a hybrid restraint. What
separates the hybrid restraint is the participation of the government in a
way that exceeds its normal role of establishing the preconditions for trade.
Thus, private discretion and government participation are both necessary
conditions for a hybrid restraint. 90
Second, the exercise of discretion by private parties must take the
form of conduct closely analogous to a recognized antitrust offense. The
antitrust laws were in general intended to promote consumer welfare by
prohibiting private activities in the marketplace that reduce efficiency, or,
stated otherwise, activities that reduce output and increase price. Practices
are anticompetitive only if they are inefficient in this technical sense.
Moreover, the laws recognize that efficiency in a dynamic sense increases
through innovation. The catalyst for innovation is the prospect of
monopoly profits; so antitrust does not oppose the acquisition of monopoly
power through legitimate, efficient means.9' Nor does antitrust in general
prohibit the full exploitation of monopoly power lawfully obtained; for the
larger the expected reward from invention and hard competition, the
greater the incentive to engage in practices that benefit consumers. 9'

(2d Cir. 1981). The dicta in Dufj' is consistent with this idea. In outcome, there is usually little
difference between finding that a state restraint on competition is unilateral and finding that the
restraint is clearly authorized by the state and self-enforcing. In both cases, the restraint avoids antitrust
condemnation under Section I. But the second approach ignores Fisher. Our definition of hybrid
restraints is broadly consistent with the test one court suggested for determining when continuing
supervision is required: "[A]ctive supervision is clearly necessary where private defendants are
empowered with some type of discretionary authority in connection with anticompetitive acts (e.g., to
determine price or rate structures)." Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., Ill F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th
Cir. 1997).
90
One could imagine a circumstance in which private parties would have successfully
restrained trade without the assistance of government, but such assistance is provided anyway. We
would call such a restraint hybrid, because it would be nearly impossible to determine that the
government's help was unnecessary. But even if the restraint were not termed hybrid, it would be
private, and so the antitrust implications would be identical.
91
As the Court has noted:
It is not enough that a single firm appears to "restrain trade" unreasonably, for
even a vigorous competitor may leave that impression. For instance, an efficient
firm may capture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient rival, whose own
ability to compete may suffer as a result. This is the rule of the marketplace and is
precisely the sort of competition that promotes the consumer interests that the
Sherman Act aims to foster. In part because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
robust competition from conduct with long-run anticompetitive effects, Congress
authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger of
monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the
antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive competitor.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984).
92
See infra Part V.
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as Fisher itself recognizes, Section 1 of the Sherman Act
"concerted" action, or agreements. The law recognizes that
among economic actors pose a special threat to consumer
the meaning of agreement, even in the context of purely

private restraints, is notoriously complex. It is a term of art whose peculiar
contours vary with the Court's understanding of a particular restraint's
likely competitive effects. 93 In practice, antitrust analysis of private
conduct has distinguished between horizontal agreements, or those among

competitors, and vertical agreements, or those between firms at different
distribution levels. 94 But a better way to understand the law is to
collusive and exclusionary anticompetitive
distinguish between
arrangements. 95 Collusive arrangements produce anticompetitive effects
solely through cooperation among the parties to them. The parties

cooperate to limit competition among themselves, thereby reducing output,
96
earning monopoly profits, and inflicting a deadweight loss on consumers.
By contrast, exclusionary practices work anticompetitive results through
coercion of market participants outside the collusive group.9 7 Such a
practice forces a seller out of the market entirely or increases the costs of a
seller that remains in the market. The loss or impairment of the seller has
no antitrust significance in its own right, but it is important when
consumers suffer because of a resulting reduction in output and increase in
market price. 98 Moreover, antitrust law historically was prone to treat as

exclusionary restraints that were neither exclusionary nor collusive, such
as a tying arrangement in which a seller conditions the sale of one product
on the purchase of another. These practices often did nothing more than

93
For example, the court in Virginia Verniculite. Ltd. v. Historic Green Springs. Inc., 307
F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2002), observed that:
[Clourts must treat the phrase "concerted action" as a term of art in the context of

the Sherman Act; it cannot be understood as it might be in ordinary parlance, to
reach any and all forms of joint activity by two or more persons. It must be
defined consonant with its role in the antitrust analysis, as the basis for
determining the unlawfulness of conduct prohibited by Section 1.
Id. at 281-82.
See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988).
94
See BORK, supra note 1, at 134; POSNER, supra note 33, at 40.
95
See BORK, supra note 1, at 135-36.
96
POSNER, supra note 33, at 40.
97
98
The categories of collusive and exclusionary practices are not wholly separate. A boycott,
for example, is both collusive, in that the participants cooperate with each other, and exclusionary, in
that a non-participant is coerced. The arrangement is nevertheless an exclusionary practice at heart. See
id. at 193. And a group of firms can contemporaneously engage in a collusive restraint and an
exclusionary restraint, the latter serving to protect the former from erosion through the competition of a
non-party. For example, the government alleged in American Tobacco that the major cigarette
companies both needlessly bought cheap tobacco in order to exclude from the market the
manufacturers of low-priced cigarettes and conspired to Fix prices. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 803-04 (1946).
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exploit the monopoly power that a single firm possessed without resort to
exclusionary restraints. 99
Finally, antitrust law recognizes a domain of private exclusionary
practices that involve neither horizontal nor vertical agreement. This is the
apparent implication of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Unless Section 2 is
completely redundant, 0 0 it must outlaw acts of actual or attempted
monopolization that do not constitute agreements within the meaning of
Section 1. Legally, these are unilateral exclusionary acts used by a private
monopolist to obtain or keep monopoly power. Of course, most practices a
monopolist might use will in fact involve cooperation with another firm,
albeit often a non-competitor. Monopolists do not often succeed by
blowing up a rival's plant or committing fraud on the patent office, acts
that could be called truly unilateral in that they involve no knowing
cooperation between actors.' ° ' Hence, important private exclusionary acts
almost always involve some concert of action in the legal sense among
private parties.
Although antitrust is broadly about preserving competition, therefore,
it is more precisely about protecting competition from private practices
that are demonstrably collusive or exclusionary. It is not a roving mandate
to ferret out consumer injury from whatever source wherever it can be
found. And historically, the law of antitrust developed in discrete doctrinal
categories, such as exclusive dealing and tying, so that the practice at issue
was slotted into the appropriate category and analyzed accordingly. Courts
have attempted to identify hybrid restraints by comparing the
arrangements at issue to recognized kinds of private anticompetitive
practices, and with good reason. States frequently act in ways that
arguably infringe on consumer interests; if consumer injury alone were
enough to trigger state action immunity analysis, the scope of antitrust
would be far broader than Congress ever imagined. Unless state or local
government seeks to implement or facilitate private practices that restrict
competition or practices much like them, there is no conflict with antitrust.
A review of the cases in which courts have addressed the issue
indicate that two forms of hybrid restraints fall within the general
definition: (1) the government enforces private arrangements that are
See generally POSNER, supra note 33, at 197-202.
99
100 Section 2 is unquestionably redundant to the extent that it prohibits conspiracies to
monopolize, for a conspiracy to monopolize would almost always, if not always, constitute a
conspiracy in restraint of trade prohibited by Section I.See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer,
L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 67 (stCir. 2002) ("Conspiracy to monopolize claims are not often the subject of
much attention, since almost any such claim could be proved more easily under section I 's ban on
conspiracies in restraint of trade.").
101 See POSNER, supra note 33, at 259-60 (observing that most "exclusionary practices,
though unilateral in the sense of not necessarily or typically involving cooperation between
competitors, do require a contract, express or implied, with someone outside the firm engaging in the
practice").
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tantamount to antitrust violations; and (2) the government mandates or
specifically authorizes particular, individual conduct by private firms that
significantly facilitates the private exercise of market power, where the
government directive serves no appreciable competitively-benign purpose.
As we explain more fully below, the first category is typified by state
mandates that permit sellers and buyers to agree on resale prices. The
second category includes, for example, state law that purposely makes it
easier for competitors to raise price above competitive levels without
reaching an explicit agreement among themselves.
Our conception of the doctrine of hybrid and unilateral governmental
restraints is consistent with most Supreme Court case law; but we make no
claim that it is consistent with all of it. In particular, in Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,'0 2 a case decided before Fisher,
the city council enacted an emergency ordinance temporarily prohibiting
an incumbent cable television operator from expanding service into new
areas of the city while the council drafted a model ordinance to encourage
competition in those areas. °3 The Court held that the city could be held
liable for an antitrust violation because its action did not qualify for state
action immunity; the home rule power granted the city under the state
constitution was not a clear and affirmative state policy.104 Though the
Court never explicitly addressed the question of whether the restraint was
hybrid, the Court's resolution implied that the moratorium ordinance
conflicted with the antitrust laws. Under our analysis, however, it was a
unilateral restraint imposed by government. We suspect that distinguishing
of antitrust conflict and immunity had not yet
clearly between the issue
05
Court.1
the
to
occurred
102 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
103 Id. at 45-46.
104 See id. at 55.
105 Indeed, Judge Garland argues that Fisher represents the Court's effort to repudiate
Boulder without explicitly overruling it. See Garland, supra note 12, at 503. But he goes on to criticize
the rationale of Fisher, arguing that the existence of an agreement, which he recognizes is necessary
for substantive Section 1 liability, was irrelevant because the plaintiffs did not allege an antitrust
violation, but rather that the ordinance was preempted. Id. at 503-04. We disagree that a law can be
preempted on its face when it does not mandate an arrangement that is tantamount to a violation. As
we show below, Mideal and Schwegmann-cases Garland cites as involving statutes that were
preempted despite the absence of illegal agreements-in fact involved arrangements that were
analogous to per sc illegal resale price maintenance. See id. at 505-06. Ultimately, Garland dismisses
Fisher, concluding that it is exclusively "the two-pronged Midcal test that now effectively determines"
whether a regulation is subject to Sherman Act attack. Id. at 507. But in the 15 years since he wrote, it
has become clear that courts do indeed ask separately whether a restraint is hybrid. See, e.g., A.D.
Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 163 F.3d 239, 258 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussed infra at note
225 and accompanying text). And though we believe that the unilateral and hybrid restraints doctrine
can be harmonized with the doctrine of state action immunity, the former is not superfluous. In
particular, a unilateral act of a subordinate government body acting under general home rule authority
would avoid preemption (and an adverse judgment on liability) under the unilateral restraint doctrine
but would fail state action immunity for want of clear legislative authorization.
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The Court understood the separate idea of antitrust conflict by the
10 6
time it decided City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,
however. This case was decided five years after Fisher,and centered on an
0 7
ordinance that restricted "the size, location, and spacing of billboards."'
Under our approach and the logic of Fisher,the ordinance was a unilateral
restraint imposed by government. Although the Court upheld the ordinance
on the ground of state action immunity, it did not even consider whether it
was a unilateral restraint.'0 While the Court's failure to mention the
unilateral restraint issue hints at a tension with our analysis, it seems most
likely that the Court found the immunity issue easier to resolve or more
important and so assumed that the restraint conflicted with antitrust.
Before turning to examples of hybrid restraints, we address in general
terms the important issue of remedies. Rice holds that when a state or local
government authorizes per se illegal anticompetitive conduct, the result is
a hybrid restraint, and the government directive can be preempted in the
abstract. If the government directive does not always result in
anticompetitive conduct, the restraint can be condemned only on a caseby-case basis. In a given case, the private defendants could be enjoined
from complying with a statute or ordinance that leads to anticompetitive
conduct. Moreover, government officials could be enjoined from requiring
the private defendants to comply with any mandatory directive. And they
might even be enjoined from enforcing the mandate in a defined set of
conditions where anticompetitive conduct would result, if that set of
conditions can be identified. The Eleventh Amendment' 0 9 would protect
the state from damage liability,"0 and the Local Government Antitrust
Act"' would shield subordinate governmental bodies from damages. But
an injunction of the kind described, even if entered against a state as
opposed to a local government official, would not run afoul of Eleventh
Amendment. 1 2 Antitrust plaintiffs routinely obtain injunctive relief
against state actors 3
106

499 U.S. 365 (1991).

107 Id. at 368.
108 The Court did consider whether an alleged conspiracy between the city council and a
billboard company affected antitrust liability. But the conspiracy under the Court's analysis related to
state action immunity under Parker, not to the potential inference that the restraint was hybrid. See id.

at 370-79.
109
110

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the Court held that Congress acting

under its Commerce Clause power cannot abrogate the sovereign immunity guaranteed a state by the
Eleventh Amendment by authorizing private parties to bring suit against a state in federal court. This
constraint on congressional power clearly applies to the federal antitrust laws, see id, at 72 n.16, and it
would bar an action for damages that would be satisfied from a state treasury, see, e.g., Earles v. State
Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1998).
111
15 U.S.C. § 34.
112 See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Seminole Tribe does not abrogate the

rule of Ex parte Young that "an individual can bring suit against a state officer in order to ensure that
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A more troubling prospect is holding private defendants liable for
treble damages when they act with the assistance of the state. But the
implication of state action analysis is that any hybrid restraint that violates
the antitrust laws and fails the rtests for immunity leaves private parties

exposed to the whole panoply of antitrust remedies. The lesson is that
private parties who restrain trade pursuant to government directives do so
at their peril.

III. Hybrid Restraints and Vertical Restrictions
As we have explained, to characterize a government-supported
restraint as hybrid, a court must analogize it to a private restraint. Private
restraints have historically been classified as vertical or horizontal.

Vertical restraints, in turn, have been divided between price and non-price
restraints. Vertical minimum price agreements are per se illegal, whereas
vertical non-price and maximum price agreements are judged under the
rule of reason. As we explain below, the economic basis for the distinction
between minimum price and other kinds of vertical restrictions is tenuous,
but the per se illegality of minimum resale price maintenance has been a
critical backdrop to the development of the hybrid restraint doctrine. The
Supreme Court has explicitly applied the term hybrid restraint to statesupported resale price maintenance more than to any other recognized
category of private antitrust offense. 1 4 Where states have sponsored
restraints that mimic private resale price maintenance, with an apparent
intent to circumvent antitrust strictures, the Court could scarcely avoid the
issue of whether a conflict existed.
We begin the elaboration of our theory of unilateral and hybrid

restraints, therefore, with an examination of distributional restraints. We
the officer's conduct is in compliance with federal law." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14; see also
TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 204 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Although recent Supreme Court cases
have added muscle to the constitutional principle of state immunity from litigation, the Court has not
questioned the continuing validity of the Young exception."). The scope of Ex parle Young was
questioned in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), but the Court explicitly noted that
"where prospective relief is sought against individual state officers in a federal forum based on a
federal right, the Eleventh Amendment, in most cases, is not a bar." Id. at 276-77. "Thus, if state
officials were violating the Sherman Act, in principle the Eleventh Amendment would not bar
injunctive relief against them." Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program,
187 F.3d 24, 28 (Ist Cir. 1999).
113 See. e.g., TFWS, 242 F.3d at 204; McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio, 226 F.3d 429,
437 (6th Cir. 2000); Neo Gen Screening, 187 F.3d at 28; PTI, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 100 F. Supp.
2d 1179, 1190-91 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that a request for an injunction that would deprive the
state of a continuing stream of income was nevertheless a claim for prospective relief and therefore
permissible under Ex parte Young).
114 In Fisher, the Court cited as examples of hybrid restraints the resale price maintenance
schemes at issue in Schwegmann and Midcal. Fisher v.City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 268 (1986).
The Court later described as hybrid the resale price maintenance scheme under consideration in 324
Liquor Corp. v.Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.8 (1987).
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first examine state-supported resale price maintenance-arrangements that
would be illegal per se if they were private. Our conclusion is that courts
are willing to declare a restraint hybrid so long as the arrangement bears
some factual resemblanceito its private counterpart, even if there is little
economic justification for condemnation. Such is the power of the per se
rule against vertical minimum price fixing. We then turn briefly to nonprice distributional restraints. Few cases have raised the issue of hybrid
versus unilateral restraints in this context, and so our discussion is general.
Because antitrust has not displayed the same hostility toward non-price
restraints that it has toward price restraints, courts have had an easier time
reserving the hybrid designation for those non-price distributional
restraints that do in fact constitute public support of private
anticompetitive choices.
A.

Resale Price Maintenance

Resale price maintenance is an antitrust puzzle. An agreement among
competitors to impose resale price floors on their customers or an
agreement among retailers to persuade their suppliers to impose price
floors on them would constitute horizontal price fixing, which would be
per se illegal regardless of the vertical aspects of the arrangement. The
horizontal agreement in either context could be inferred from
circumstantial evidence. But a minimum resale price agreement between a
single supplier and retailer is also illegal," 5 even though, by itself, it
typically causes no demonstrable harm to competition." 16 At one time, the
Court believed that resale price restrictions imposed by a single
manufacturer for its own interests had the same anticompetitive effects as
a dealers' cartel" 7 and so merited per se treatment. Even though that view
has long since been discredited, the per se illegality of resale price
maintenance remains.8
Mitigating the overbreadth of the per se rule, however, the Court has
narrowed the definition of the agreement necessary to find resale price
maintenance. The Colgate doctrine states that when a supplier announces
that it will sell only to retailers that adhere to specified minimum resale
115 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). By contrast, a
vertical agreement as to maxinum resale prices is not illegal per se, though in theory it could violate
the antitrust laws under the rule of reason. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997).
116 For a survey of theories of resale price maintenance and an empirical study of resale price
maintenance cases, see Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from
Litigation, 34 J.L. & ECON. 263 (1991).

117 See Dr. Miles Med. Co., 220 U.S. at 408.
118 Although vertical minimum price agreements are illegal per se, vertical non-price
restrictions, even if agreed to explicitly by the parties, are illegal only if unreasonable. See Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). In cases of non-price distributional restraints,
the issue is rarely whether an agreement exists, but whether the agreement is unreasonable.
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prices, and a retailer thereafter buys the product and adheres to the price
restriction, no antitrust agreement is formed, even though the arrangement
could comfortably be called an agreement within the law of contracts." 9
Yet the boundaries of the Colgate doctrine are notoriously hazy. An
agreement is formed if a supplier announces that it will refuse to sell to
any wholesaler that sells to retailers who fail to adhere to suggested
minimum resale prices. 2 ° And one is formed if a supplier obtains
acquiescence in a resale price maintenance system by persuading retailers
to adhere to the suggested prices. 2' But an agreement on resale prices
cannot be inferred from an agreement between a supplier and a retailer that
122
the supplier will cut off a price-cutting competitor of the retailer.
Notably, nothing in the logic of Colgate turns on whether or not the
supplier has economic leverage with respect to the retailer. A retailer may
acquiesce in his supplier's announced resale price maintenance policy out
of fear of the consequences of termination, but acquiescence does not
create an agreement. As the Court later bluntly stated in Monsanto, "a
distributor is free to acquiesce in the manufacturer's [resale price] demand
in order to avoid termination" without thereby exceeding the bounds of
Colgate.' This tortured history of the Colgate doctrine betrays an
uneasiness with the per se treatment of resale price maintenance.
The Monsanto Court offered general guidance on the meaning of
agreement in the context of vertical price fixing. It suggested that an
agreement arises if "the manufacturer and others had a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful
objective.' 24 The Court went on to explain that an agreement in a case
alleging termination of a distributor pursuant to illegal vertical price fixing
"includes more than a showing that the distributor conformed to the
suggested price. It means as well that evidence must be presented both that
the distributor communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and that this
was sought by the manufacturer."' 25 To establish an agreement, the
plaintiff must offer evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the
parties acted independently.
In each of the cases in which the Court has invalidated a statesupported restraint as hybrid, it has done so at least partially on the ground
that the restraint amounted to resale price maintenance. In Midcal, for
example, the Court observed that "California's system for wine pricing
plainly constitute[d] resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman
119
120
121
122
123

See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
See United States v.Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,45 (1960).
See id. at 46.
See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988).
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).

124
125

Id. at 764 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 764 n.9.

HeinOnline -- 20 Yale J. on Reg. 294 2003

State Action and Hybrid Restraints

Act."' 126 The Court characterized
"blanketing a state with resale price
"[m]andatory industrywide resale
recently observed:

the restraint in Schwegmann as
fixing"'12 7 and the restraint in Duffy as
price fixing." 2 8 As one court has
I

[All three cases involve] schemes [that] were structured to allow one
party (manufacturer or wholesaler) to set the resale prices to be charged
by purchasers at the next (level. The resemblance to traditional private
resale price maintenance ... was so close that the Supreme Court treated
the arrangements as if they were nothing more than private resale price
maintenance schemes licensed and abetted by the state. 29
In contrast, the regulations of liquor distribution that the Court has upheld
were insufficiently analogous to resale price maintenance. The designation
statute in Rice also gave distillers the power to control their purchasers, but
only by limiting customers rather than by setting prices. 30 Vertical
nonprice restraints are not per se illegal but are judged under the rule of
reason.131 Similarly, the price filing and most-favored-nation affirmations
in Hostetter bore only a "speculative" connection to possible 13antitrust
2
violations, and so the scheme could not be condemned on its face.
On closer scrutiny, however, the nature of the analogy of the
restraints in Midcal, Schwegmann, and Duffy to resale price maintenance is
far from clear. Resale price maintenance is illegal only when the parties
agree to it. The Court characterized the statutory scheme in Midcal as
resale price maintenance because "[t]he wine producer holds the power to
prevent price competition by dictating the prices charged by
wholesalers.' 33 But under the Colgate doctrine, where a manufacturer
dictates a price that a distributor must follow, there is no agreement.
Colgate allows sellers to announce the conditions under which they will
continue to deal with buyers; if the seller does so and the distributor
merely complies, there is no agreement. 34 Nor does the fact that the state
compels compliance supply the element of agreement. Fisher holds that
compliance with a state-imposed price requirement does not entail an

126 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103 (1980).
127 Schwegmann Bros. v. Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 390 (1990).
128 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 342 (1987).
129 Mass. Food Ass'n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 197 F.3d 560, 565
(I st Cir. 1999).
130 See Rice v. Norman Williams, 458 U.S. 654, 661-62 (1982).
131 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,44 (1977).
132 See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45-46 (1966).
133 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103 (1980)
(emphasis added).
134

See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 300-07 (1919).

HeinOnline -- 20 Yale J. on Reg. 295 2003

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 20:269, 2003

agreement with the entity that imposes it;' 35 why legally mandated
compliance with a privately determined price constitutes an agreement
with a private entity is not obvious. There is no "meeting of the minds" in
Midcal any more than in Fisher.
The scheme in Schwegmann involved an agreement between the
distiller and at least one distributor. But that agreement by itself was valid
(at the time) under the Miller-Tydings Act. What brought the arrangement
into conflict with the Sherman Act was its. application of the price to
nonsigners, who by definition did not agree to the price. As the Court
wrote:
[W]hen a state compels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it
demands private conduct which the Sherman Act forbids. Elimination of
price competition at the retail level may, of course, lawfully result if a
distributor successfully negotiates individual "vertical" agreements with
all his retailers. But when retailers are forced to abandon price
competition, they are driven into a compact in violation of the spirit of
the proviso which forbids "horizontal" price fixing. A real sanction can
be given the prohibitions of the proviso only if the price maintenance
power granted a distributor is limited to voluntary engagements. 136
The Court went on to add that "[c]ontracts or agreements convey the idea
of a cooperative arrangement, not a program whereby recalcitrants are
dragged in by the heels and compelled to submit to price fixing."' 3 7 Thus,
the Court understood that, from the nonsigners' perspective, the
arrangement was a legally imposed price. But it was a legally imposed
price only in the sense that if the nonsigner remained a distributor, legal
sanctions could be brought to bear on him if he did not adhere to the price.
Under Colgate, a supplier can refuse to deal with a distributor that does not
138
adhere to a specified resale price, and the law will support that decision.
Either way, the supplier has a lawful method of inducing the reluctant
dealer to adhere to the set resale price, and it is not clear that the method
approved of by the state in Schwegrnann would have resulted in any
greater compliance. 39 So the restraint was illegal in Schwegmann
135 See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 267 (1986).
136 341 U.S. at 389 (citation omitted).
137 Id. at 390.
138 See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
139 Justice Stevens addressed a similar point in Rice. Apart from the Califomia designation
statute, if a wholesaler refused to accept a customer restriction demanded by the distiller, the distiller
could lawfully refuse to trade with the wholesaler. If the distiller has sufficient market power, the
wholesaler will accede to the demand. But, according to Justice Stevens, it is "possible that, absent the
state laws, the distillers would have insufficient market power to obtain and enforce such agreements.
The designation statute therefore may give the distillers more power over Califomia importers than
was taken away by the Oklahoma laws." Rice v.Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 668 (Stevens, J.,
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precisely because it was not an agreement; yet under Colgate, resale price
maintenance is illegal only when there is an agreement. The Court
anyway because it conflicted with "the spirit of"
condemned the scheme
40
the Sherman Act.

It is still less clear what the relevant agreement was in Duffy. Recall
that the state in that case prescribed a twelve percent markup for retailers
over prices posted by wholesalers, but it effectively permitted wholesalers
to increase the margin by selling below posted prices and by raising the
posted prices to which retail prices were keyed after wholesale purchase
but before resale.'14 One federal appellate judge has suggested that this
arrangement involved "a degree of private regulatory power" but not the
power "independently to set prices via an agreement." 42 Consequently, he
maintained, the Court "misunderstood its own precedents" in Duffy,
because that case involved "classic unilateral state action.'

43

The judge

was correct to point out that there was no conventional agreement in Duffy;
but, as we have just seen, that feature of the scheme does not distinguish
the case from the Supreme Court's earlier hybrid restraint precedents.
Thus, if the arrangements in Schwegmann, Midcal, and Duffy are
unlawful because of their similarity to resale price maintenance, it is not
because they involve the sort of agreement a court would require in the
context of private resale price maintenance. The presence of a government
enforcement mechanism for a private choice of a price term was sufficient
for the Court to find that the arrangement was functionally equivalent to
the private offense of resale price maintenance. This result can only follow
if the definition of agreement in the context of hybrid restraints differs
from the definition of agreement in the contexts of private restraints and
purely governmental restraints.
The Court's adaptations of the definition of concerted action when
applied to hybrid restraints are a testament to the strange antitrust status of
private resale price maintenance. When viewed purely as a vertical
concurring). But again, it is not clear that the statutes change the outcome. If Califomia importers
would have had sufficient power to resist a demand for a distributional restraint, they presumably
would have had sufficient power to insist that their preferred suppliers be "designated" pursuant to the
California statute.
140 See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
141 See supra note 74-75 and accompanying text.
142 TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 214 (4th Cir. 2001) (Luttig, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
143 Id. at 213-14. In TFWS, discussed infra at notes 212-223 and accompanying text, the
Fourth Circuit struck down under the Sherman Act a Maryland liquor control system that required
liquor wholesalers to post their prices and adhere to them for at least a month and prohibited
wholesalers from granting volume discounts. The court remanded for reconsideration of whether the
Twenty-first Amendment barred application of the Sherman Act. Id. at 213. The court held that the
regulatory scheme was a hybrid restraint. Judge Luttig found that the scheme was indistinguishable
from the restraint in Duffy, and so he believed that the court was bound to follow Duffy and declare the
system hybrid even though that case was wrongly decided.
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phenomenon, that is, apart from horizontal competitive implications, resale
price maintenance remains per se illegal despite the lack of a coherent
economic basis for such treatment. In the private context, the Colgate
doctrine, even with its, limitations, serves as a check on the economic
mischief that per se illegality can do. But it does so by blunting the impact
of a rule that many want passionately to preserve.144 State-supported
vertical price restraints can be called concerted action, and hence subject to
per se condemnation, because the logic of Colgate is so weak. To be sure,
state-supported resale price maintenance schemes may authorize explicit
vertical price agreements, which would not be protected under Colgate in
any event. And the ability of a supplier to bring legal sanctions to bear on a
dealer who does not adhere to set resale prices is not identical to the power
a supplier has to enforce suggested resale prices by refusing to trade with a
dealer. These are differences in form that provide a convenient basis for
distinguishing hybrid resale price maintenance from unilateral private
action. But they are not differences in economic substance. The
designation of state-supported vertical price restraints as hybrid is the
triumph of Dr. Miles over Colgate. Below, we suggest that state-supported
resale price maintenance can appropriately be treated as hybrid because of
its horizontal implications. But we are not convinced that the Court's
treatment is based on those implications.
The upshot of the Supreme Court's cases drawing the elusive line
between hybrid and unilateral restraints is that a restraint is hybrid if it is
sufficiently analogous to an antitrust violation, even if it does not meet the
technical requirements of the private offense. A state-supported restraint
may even be invalid if it merely violates the spirit of the general
prohibition. This process of analogy involves taking into account the
policies of the substantive categories of antitrust themselves, even when
they may be unconvincing from an economic perspective, and an
awareness of the nature of governmental action. In light of those policies,
state implementation of a private choice concerning resale prices is
functionally
equivalent to a private vertical agreement on price or price
4
levels.1

1

144 See, e.g., BORK, supra note I, at xiii (noting that an influential political group favors the
rule of per se illegality of resale price maintenance).
145 This view of hybrid restraints helps explain Fisher's characterization of state-imposed
rent controls as unilateral or governmental and, therefore, valid. So long as the government itself
determines the rents, the restraint cannot be hybrid, because it cannot plausibly be analogized to a
private cartel. The separate motivations of regulators, whatever they may be, are different from those
of self-interested landlords. Although we certainly cannot attribute a public-interest motivation to rent
control, we can rule out any suggestion that it is enacted to provide enforcement of landlords'
preferences. Whatever the goals of rent control, its mechanisms are in no way analogous to a private
cartel.
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B.

Non-price DistributionalRestraints

If a firm were to impose by contract a non-price distributional
restriction, the restraint would be private. A state would remain free to
enforce the contract, so long as the restraint did not overstep the
requirements of the rule of reason in a particular case. But any attempt by
a state to enforce a private restraint that violates the antitrust laws would
render the restraint hybrid. As a practical matter, the state's effort, through
its courts, to enforce an unreasonable restraint would be preempted.
The picture changes somewhat if a state specifically authorizes or
mandates particular non-price distributional restraints. Unless these
restraints will predictably have anticompetitive effects in nearly all
applications by facilitating tacit collusion-a subject we consider belowthey presumably could have anticompetitive effects in some circumstances
but not others. As Rice teaches, such a governmental directive cannot be
preempted in the abstract. But it could be preempted in its application, if
the statutory authority is used to produce anticompetitive effects and does
not qualify for state action immunity. Here, the discretion granted to
private parties enforced by the government creates a hybrid restraint when
the discretion is used to produce anticompetitive effects. In Rice, therefore,
an antitrust court could appropriately strike down as hybrid a private
implementation of the California designation statute that had
anticompetitive consequences. Not every use of the discretion specifically
contemplated by the statute to designate wholesalers will have
anticompetitive effects. In fact, as the Rice Court pointed out, the statute
of any kind; the
did not require the distiller to impose vertical restraints
46
distiller had the discretion not to impose restraints.
State law may, however, impose anticompetitive distributional
restraints without enforcing private discretion. In Massachusetts Food
Association v. MassachusettsAlcoholic Beverages Control Commission,
state law provided that "no one can own more than three retail liquor
stores" in the state. 148 We consider below the possibility that the law might
lead to anticompetitive effects through tacit collusion. 149 But to the extent
that any anticompetitive effects were purely vertical, those effects were
produced by compliance with the law itself, not by the exercise of private
146 See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 662 (1982).
147 197 F.3d 560 (1st Cir. 1999).
148 Id. at 562. Ironically, the Supreme Court in Rice, in an effort to emphasize the lack of
anticompetitive potential of the California designation statute, noted that the law did not limit the
"number of importers which may be designated by the distiller." Rice, 458 U.S. at 662. The
Massachusetts scheme did indeed limit the number of retail outlets a single dealer could own. But the
dictum in Rice was intended to show that the restriction at issue was even less suspect than it might
have been, not that a restriction on the number of distributors would be invalid under the antitrust laws.
149 See infra Section IV.A.
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discretion. Writing for the First Circuit, Judge Boudin aptly described
hybrid restraints as "state licensing of arrangements between private
parties that suppress competition-not state directives that by themselves
limit or reduce competition"' 50 . Private "arrangements" imply the kind of
discretion to inflict consumer injury that is a necessary condition of a
hybrid restraint, as we define it. The restraint at issue, according to the
court, was unilateral action because "the state has not ordered or
authorized private parties to engage in conduct that, absent immunity,
would even arguably violate the antitrust laws; there is no private
agreement or arrangement between retailers as to the number of retail
outlets and therefore no violation to be shielded."' 5' The court properly
rejected the argument that the "statute is preempted because it produces an
effect that could not be produced by agreement of private parties without
violating the antitrust laws,"' 52 reasoning that "much [legitimate] direct
government regulation prohibiting one form of economic activity or
requiring another involves directives that private parties could not
53
themselves implement without violating the antitrust laws."'
IV. Hybrid Restraints and Tacit Collusion
To this point, we have emphasized the Supreme Court's decisions on
hybrid restraints, which have (not coincidentally) involved state-imposed
vertical restraints in the distribution of alcoholic beverages. The stage is
now set for consideration of state-sponsored horizontal restraints. Some
applications of the concept of hybrid restraints are straightforward.
Express, horizontal price fixing has been per se illegal from the earliest
years of the Sherman Act. 54 Under the logic of Midcal, a state regulatory
scheme that authorizes insurers' 55 or truckers'56 jointly to establish rates is
a hybrid restraint because it gives private firms the power to exercise
discretion in a way that reduces consumer welfare.157 Such a restraint is
150 Mass. Food Ass'n, 197 F.3d at 565.
151
d.at 562.
152 ld. at 564.
153 Id. at 564-65.
154 See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. TransMissouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
155 See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (holding state regulatory program
authorizing joint rate-making by title insurance companies was not immune under the state action
doctrine because of a lack of active supervision).
156 See S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985)
(holding a state regulatory program authorizing joint rate-making by trucking companies immune
under the state action doctrine).
157 See also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (denying immunity to peer review system
controlled by private physicians). Similarly, if a state allowed a single competitor to choose a price,
and ordered all other competitors to charge the price selected, the regulation would amount to
authorization of an explicit price fixing arrangement. See Garland, supra note 12, at 506 (posing a
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invalid, unless the state as sovereign adopts the policy to restrict
competition and reasserts its control by active supervision of the prices,
thereby satisfying the requirements of state action immunity: "Actual state
involvement, not deference to private price fixing arrangements under the
general auspices of state law, is the precondition for immunity from
federal law."' 58 Deference to private price fixing is thus a hybrid restraint.
Indeed, Midcal and Schwegmann both involved privately determined
resale prices that were binding on all retailers. In both contexts, the Court
characterized the arrangement as tantamount not only to resale price
maintenance, as we saw in the last part, but to horizontal price fixing. In
Schwegmann, for example, the Court wrote that "when retailers are forced
to abandon price competition, they are driven into a compact in violation
of the spirit of the proviso [of the Miller-Tydings Act] which forbids
'horizontal' price fixing."' 159 And Duffy interpreted Midcal as "involv[ing]
horizontal as well as vertical price fixing," because "the wholesalers ...
were required to adhere to a single fair trade contract or price schedule for
each geographical area."'16 A state law that is tantamount to express price
fixing is invalid, unless it satisfies the requirements of state-action
immunity, that is, clear articulation and active supervision.
But what if the law merely facilitates tacit collusion? Certainly, in
that circumstance, any express collusion by firms subject to the statute
would run afoul of Section 1 as a private restraint and, for want of state
supervision, would not be immune.16 We argue, however, that in some
circumstances, state-sponsored facilitating practices can amount to hybrid
restraints that expose private actors to potential damages liability and are
subject to an injunction against enforcement in a suit against the
appropriate public officer. In these cases, private discretion, which lies at
the heart of any hybrid restraint, is not the discretion to engage in the
facilitating practice; the statute may unambiguously compel private actors
similar hypothetical). There is no question that the restraint would be hybrid.
158 Ticor, 504 U.S. at 633.
159 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S 384, 389 (1951).
160

324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 342 (1987).

161 In McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio, 226 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2000), the state enacted a
statute that required an out-of-state truck remanufacturer selling from an office in Ohio to obtain
agreements from nearby chassis dealers that they would provide warranty service to the customers of
the remanufacturer. The dealers, who were competitors of the remanufacturer, refused to enter into
such agreements, thereby allegedly excluding the remanufacturer from the market, but the
remanufacturer sued state and county officials, not the dealers. In an obtuse opinion, the court correctly
held that the statute was not preempted under Rice because it did not mandate conduct that in all cases
would violate the Sherman Act. Id. at 441. The court also correctly observed that the statute may
"facilitate[] . ..coordinated action . . . by dealers in refusing to enter binding agreements," and the
remanufacturer might then sue the dealers under the antitrust laws. Id. But in such a case, the statute
would not "facilitate" joint exclusionary behavior in the way that post-and-hold regulations facilitate
tacit collusion. The proper conclusion would be that a concerted refusal to deny the remanufacturer the
agreements required by law is a private restraint, not a unilateral or a hybrid restraint.
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to engage in the precise conduct that facilitates tacit collusion. Rather,
private discretion inheres in the private collusion that compliance with the
statute predictably enables. This collusion, not the conduct required by the
statute, is the source of the anticompetitive injury.
This idea is also implicit, to some degree, in the Supreme Court's
hybrid restraint cases that address resale price maintenance. As the Court
in Duffy observed:
We have noted that industrywide resale price maintenance also may
facilitate cartelization. Mandatory industrywide resale price fixing is
virtually certain to reduce interbrand competition as well as intrabrand
competition, because it prevents manufacturers and wholesalers from
allowing or requiring retail price competition. The New York statute
specifically forbids retailers to reduce the minimum prices set by

wholesalers.

162

Thus, the Court has recognized that one reason for invalidating state law is
that it facilitates cartelization. But resale price maintenance is only one of
a range of possible facilitating practices. We begin by setting out the law's
treatment of facilitating practices in the context of purely private restraints.
We then examine how the lower federal courts have made use of the
concept in analyzing hybrid restraints.
A.

Tacit Collusion in Antitrust Law
As Judge Richard Posner recently noted:
[Section 1's language is] broad enough ... to encompass a purely tacit
agreement to fix prices, that is, an agreement made without any actual
communication among the parties to the agreement. If a firm raises price
in the expectation that its competitors will do likewise, and they do, the
firm's behavior can be conceptualized as the offer of a unilateral contract
that the offerees accept by raising their prices. Or as the creation of a
contract implied in fact. 63

This observation echoes Posner's long-held belief, supported by elaborate
argument, that the law should use economic evidence to challenge tacit

162 Duffy, 379 U.S. at 342 (citation omitted).
163 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002). The
passage recognizes the standard principle of contract law that acceptance of an offer in proper
circumstances may be inferred from performance. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 148 (3d
ed. 1999).
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collusion under Section 1.164 But as Judge Posner himself recognizes,
courts have not (yet) adopted this view, at least not universally. 6 The law
does not, of course, require a formal agreement. 166 Rivals can agree by
uniformly complying with an express proposal of an anticompetitive
scheme. 167 Moreover, in many cases, an explicit agreement can be inferred
from uniform behavior when the conduct of the parties almost certainly
would have varied had the parties been acting independently.1 8 For
example, if sellers submit identical bids on specialized, complex products,
an explicit agreement may be inferred, if other evidence does not explain
the parallelism. 169 In some cases, an actual agreement might be inferred
from circumstantial evidence even if the competitors never directly
communicated with each other. 70 Though communication of some kind is
indispensable to agreement, the parties can communicate through an
intermediary. 7 ' Cases in which explicit agreements can only be proven
164 Judge Posner has set out his views in a systematic way most recently in Antitrust Law,
POSNER, supra note 33, at 51-100. But he offered a similar analysis as early as 1969 in Richard A.
Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969)
[hereinafter Posner, Oligopoly].
165 See High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 654 (Posner, J.) ("[l]t isgenerally believed...
that an express, manifested agreement, and thus an agreement involving actual, verbalized
communication, must be proved in order for a price-fixing conspiracy to be actionable under the
Sherman Act.").
166 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) ("No formal
agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy.").
167 In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), the Court observed:
It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without
simultaneous action or agreement on the part of' the conspirators. Acceptance by
competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan,
the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate
commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman
Act.
Id. at 227 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Though Interstate Circuit was a case of collusive
exclusion, not pure collusion, the principal is general. A stark example of an invitation to collude is
provided in United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984). The president of
American Airlines, one of the two major air carriers operating out of Dallas-Fort Worth, in a phone
call with the president of Braniff, the other major carrier, said, "Raise your god-damn fares twenty
percent. I'll
raise mine the next morning." Id. at 1116. The Braniff president neither gave verbal assent
nor raised his fares. But the court unquestionably would have found an agreement had the Braniff
president done either.
168 An agreement among competitors to divide territories or customers could be inferred
from conduct alone where economic conditions imply that the firms would be competing in the
absence of an agreement.
169 See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 660 (1962). Similarly, an actual agreement
can be inferred if a large number of sellers in a market maintain the same price despite a decline in
demand leaving them operating at sixty percent capacity. Id. at 659.
170 The Court once observed, "As is usual in cases of alleged unlawful agreements to restrain
commerce, the Government is without the aid of direct testimony that the distributors entered into any
agreement with each other ....In order to establish agreement it is compelled to rely on inferences
drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators." Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 221.
171 Interstate Circuit may be a case in which mutual assent was communicated through an
intermediary, though the case involved essentially an exclusionary practice, not a purely collusive
restraint. The Court inferred an agreement among film distributors to accede to the demands of an
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indirectly pose an evidentiary challenge for the law, 7 2 but they do not

strain the concept of agreement.
By contrast, if competitors are able to raise price to supra-competitive
levels without overt communication or explicit agreement simply by
taking each other's anticipated reactions into account in setting price, the
nature of an antitrust agreement is called into question. If an agreement is
found to exist, it will have to be inferred from circumstantial evidence,
especially evidence of parallel pricing conduct. But the more difficult issue
is whether the interaction of competitors in such a case constitutes an
"agreement" at all. This situation is the now-familiar problem of tacit
collusion,
or oligopolistic interdependence, that has long vexed antitrust
73
law.'

The policy debate is illustrated by the divergent views of Posner and
Donald Turner. Turner concluded years ago that, "while there are arguable
grounds for saying there is no agreement" when oligopolists simply take
into account the probable reactions of competitors in setting their basic
prices, "there are far better grounds for saying that ... it is not unlawful

agreement."',

74

Turner rests his position first on the premise that an

oligopolist is acting rationally and in precisely the same way as a firm in a
competitive market,7 5 and it would simply be unjust to punish firms for
76
acting rationally and in the same way that other firms act with impunity.
But Turner's second and decisive argument is that no court could impose a

sensible and appropriate remedy on the oligopolists.177 An injunction
exhibitor to impose restrictions on other exhibitors. The Court relied in part on evidence that the
exhibitor made his demands in a letter that "named on its face as addressees the eight local
representatives of the distributors, and so from the beginning each of the distributors knew that the
proposals were under consideration by the others." Id. at 222. As the facts of this case suggest, the
intermediary can be a supplier or customer, so a horizontal agreement can have a vertical aspect. See
also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942) (holding that a horizontal agreement
can be formed through a series of vertical agreements where parties at one level are aware that their
competitors are entering into the same kind of agreement).
172 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 241 (1996) ("Antitrust law ...sometimes
permits judges or juries to premise antitrust liability upon little more than uniform behavior among
competitors, preceded by conversations implying that later uniformity might prove desirable or
accompanied by other conduct that in context suggests that each competitor failed to make an
independent decision.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
173 See generally John E. Lopatka, Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner's Try, 41
ANTITRUST BULL. 843 (1996).

174 Turner, supra note 169, at 671 (emphasis added).
175 Id. at 665 ("The rational oligopolist simply takes one more factor into account-the
reactions of his competitors to any price change he makes.").
176 Id. at 666 (observing that "it seems questionable to call the behavior of oligopolists in
setting their prices unlawful when the behavior in essence is identical to that of sellers in a competitive
industry"). This interpretation is bolstered by Tumer's further argument that the oligopolists are much
like the lawful monopolist that merely charges a monopoly price. See id. at 667.
177 See id. at 669-70; see also JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775,
780 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that "the most compelling objection" to holding that purely tacit collusion
violates the Sherman Act "has nothing to do with the language of the Sherman Act but rather is the
difficulty of formulating effective relief without transforming the district court into a regulatory
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directed at the activity, a common Section 1 remedy, would be either
"hopelessly vague,"' 78 demand "irrational behavior,"'179 or result in
something akin to undesirable "public-utility regulation."" 0 Significantly,
Turner would allow a Section 1 challenge to interdependent pricing that is
supported by facilitating practices, such as basing point pricing,18 ' because
those practices could more readily be enjoined than simple interdependent
pricing.182
By contrast, Posner has insisted not only that "tacit collusion" is "a
form of concerted action" but that it violates Section 1.183 And though he
concedes that "[r]emedy is a problem,"' 8 4 he argues that tacit collusion can
be addressed using the remedies of Section 1. He reasons that "[tlacit
collusion is not an unconscious state" and that, therefore, a Section 1-type
' 85
remedy would not imply "telling oligopolists to behave irrationally.'
Posner would allow a damages remedy' 86 coupled with an injunction
against any facilitating practices. 8 7 Of course, in the case of pure
interdependent pricing, by definition, there are no facilitating practices.
Turner is willing to condemn cases of oligopolistic interdependence
supported by facilitating practices precisely because he, too, can envision a
sensible injunction against such practices.' 88 So the practical difference
between Turner and Posner is that in the case of pure pricing
interdependence-a case they both believe will be unusual "'-Turner
agency"); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (ist Cir. 1988) (observing
that courts refuse to condemn interdependent pricing "not because such pricing is desirable (itis not),
but because it is close to impossible to devise a judicially enforceable remedy for 'interdependent
pricing').
178
Turner, supra note 169, at 669.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181
See id. at 675-76.
182
See id. at 676 ("Finally, in sharp contrast to the basic-price case, here a perfectly
understandable, plausible, and readily enforceable injunction can be written which would have
excellent prospects, in most cases, of making price behavior substantially more competitive.").
183
POSNER, supra note 33, at 94. He acknowledges that in this respect he "part[s] company
with most other economically minded students of antitrust policy." Id.
184
Id. at 98.
185
Id. at 97,98.
186 Posner would prefer an action for damages brought by the Justice Departmcnt on behalf
of the victims of antitrust violations, a form of suit that would require a statutory change, to a private
treble-damages action. Id. at 99. But he is apparently willing to accept the private damages suit as a
second-best alternative.
187 Id. at 98-99. This conception of an appropriate Section 1 remedy marks a slight change in
thinking. Posner earlier advocated "a relatively simple and general injunction against express or tacit
price-fixing," together with a damages sanction. Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 164, at 1591 & n.76. He
apparently no longer believes that such an injunction would be useful.
188 See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
189 See POSNER, supra note 33, at 97 ("[T]here probably are few cases of purely tacit
collusion."); Turner, supra note 169, at 662 (noting that "it may well be that in reality a stable and firm
pattern
of noncompetitive prices is rarely achieved without some kind of [unlawful] agreement"). See
generally Lopatka, supra note 173, at 879-80.
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would find no unlawful agreement, whereas Posner would impose
damages liability.
As noted above, courts generally have been unwilling to find
unlawful agreements solely on the basis, of interdependent pricing. To this
extent, they have sided with Turner. They have required evidence of "plus
factors," such as the defendants' use of practices that facilitate
interdependent pricing.' 90 But they have not made clear whether simple
interdependent pricing behavior, devoid of plus factors, is not an
agreement at all on the one hand or that it is a lawful agreement on the
other.l9t

Courts have rarely condemned the merely parallel use of practices
that have plausible efficiency justifications. 92 But where competitors
explicitly agree to adopt practices that serve little purpose other than to
facilitate collusion, 93 courts are more willing to declare the agreement
unlawful, even if no overt agreement on prices can be detected. 94 For

190 See. e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that a price
fixing agreement "may be inferred on the basis of conscious parallelism, when such interdependent
conduct is accompanied by circumstantial evidence and plus factors such as defendants' use of
facilitating practices"); Blomquist Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.3d 1028, 1032-34 (8th Cir.
2000) (finding insufficient evidence of "plus factors" to support an inference of agreement in a case
based on a theory of conscious parallelism); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d
Cir. 1999) (noting that courts "require that evidence of a defendant's parallel pricing be supplemented
with 'plus factors' in order for a court to infer a conspiracy from circumstantial evidence). One court
summarized the state of the law as follows: Courts "have almost uniformly held, at least in the pricing
area, that ... individual pricing decisions (even when each firm rests its decision upon its belief that
competitors will do the same) do not constitute an unlawful agreement under section 1 of the Sherman
Act." Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.).
191 Turner observes that, as a legal matter, the conclusion that firms engaged in simple
pricing interdependence do not violate Section I can be stated in either of two ways: "(I) there is no
violation because there is no 'agreement'; or (2) there is no violation because, although there is
,agreement,' the agreement cannot properly be called an unlawful agreement." Turner, supra note 169,
at 671. Though Turner prefers the latter formulation, he notes that "either way of formulating the result
is supportable." Id. In most cases, because the legal effect is the same, the formulation does not matter,
and this may be why courts have devoted little attention to distinguishing between the formulations.
192 See. e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984). But see
Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd by an equally divided court
sub noin. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949) (upholding a finding that a basing-point
system was unlawful without insisting on evidence of an agreement, though such evidence in fact
existed).
193 For a fascinating study of the use of facilitating practices by a cartel, see David Genesove
& Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar
Institute Case, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 379 (2001). The authors observe that the sugar cartel never directly
fixed prices nor allocated market shares. "Instead, it fixed rules. These rules . . . covered every
conceivable aspect of the distribution and marketing of sugar other than the basis price itself. In this
way, the refiners eliminated the differential treatment of customers and harmonized contractual
practices, thus facilitating the detection of secret price cuts." Id. at 380. On rule-fixing generally, see
Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 941.
194 See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th
Cir. 2002) ("There is authority for prohibiting as a violation of the Sherman Act or of Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act an agreement that facilitates collusive activity .... ").
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example, Catalano v. Target Sales' 95 holds that an agreement to eliminate
discounts is per se illegal, even though competitors remain free to compete
on the ultimate price. Eliminating discounting facilitates tacit collusion by
instantly exposing price cutters when basic prices are readily
observable. 96 Similarly, an agreement to adopt a basing point pricing
system is unlawful because it reduces the number of variables rivals must
accommodate in reaching an agreement on the ultimate price.' 97 And
courts would summarily condemn an agreement among competitors to
impose resale price maintenance even if the agreement did not specify the
prices, because, as the Court noted in the passage from Duffy quoted
earlier, industry-wide resale price maintenance is often a device that
facilitates collusion by reducing the incentive to cheat on the cartel. 98 But
explicit agreements to engage in ambiguous practices-practices that may
facilitate collusion but may instead increase efficiency-are generally
treated less harshly, though they may be condemned. For example,
agreements to exchange price information are judged under the rule of
reason and may or may not be found unlawful;' 99 alternatively, such
agreements may be used as circumstantial evidence of per se illegal price
fixing.20 0
The more difficult case concerns the parallel adoption of facilitating
practices without direct proof of explicit agreement. When the practice
seems to facilitate collusion unambiguously, there is good reason to
condemn it, and courts have been on occasion willing to do so. 20 ' Turner,
195 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (holding an agreement among competitors not to extend trade credit
illegal per se).
196 Selective discounting tends to imply price discrimination, and this kind of price
discrimination can be an indication that sellers are cheating on a tacit cartel arrangement. If so, an
agreement to eliminate discounting may shore up the cartel. See generally POSNER, supra note 33, at
79-86.
197 See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 696-700, 709-17 (1948); POSNER, supra
note 33, at 91-93.
198 See POSNER, supra note 33, at 88-89; Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want
Fair Trade?,3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
199 See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)
("[E]xchanges of [price data and other] information do not constitute a per se violation of the Sherman
Act."); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that an agreement to exchange
price information "is not illegal per se, but can be found unlawful under a rule of reason analysis). See
generally Dennis W. Carlton et al., Communication Among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust,
5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423, 424 (1997) (arguing that "in the absence of direct evidence to form a
'naked' cartel to restrict output or to raise price, the appropriate legal standard to judge the flow of
information among competitors isthe rule of reason").
200 See Todd, 275 F.3d at 198 (observing that an information exchange is a facilitating
practice "that can help support an inference of a price-fixing agreement," but noting the "closely
related but analytically distinct type of claim" that the information exchange itself is unlawful under
the rule of reason).
201 See. e.g., Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd by an
equally divided court sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949) (upholding a finding
that a basing-point system was unlawful under the Federal Trade Commission Act without insisting on
evidence of an agreement, though such evidence in fact existed).
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for example, is willing to condemn parallel adoption of a basing-point
price system, though he would not outlaw pure interdependent pricing.2 °2
He observes that parallel adoption of a delivered-price system can be
"somewhat more readily characterized as 'agreement' than parallel basic
pricing. ' 20 3 But he would accord different legal treatment to the practices
not for that reason, but largely because a sensible remedy can be applied
only in the price system case.20 4 Posner would allow illegal tacit collusion
to be inferred from all evidence, including the use of a basing point
system. 2°5 But courts have been reluctant to condemn the parallel use of
practices they deem competitively ambiguous, including delivered price
20 6
systems.
B.

State Regulation and Tacit Collusion

The law of hybrid restraints has striking implications for the concept
of tacit collusion, particularly in the context of facilitating practices. We
argue here that, where the government mandates or specifically authorizes
individual conduct by private firms that significantly facilitates
noncompetitive pricing, the arrangement should be considered a hybrid
restraint unless the government directive serves another appreciable and
plausible purpose. Because governmental restraints are at issue, the
plausibility of the purpose should be evaluated deferentially. The domain
of justifications for government regulation is far broader than the domain
of justifications for private horizontal agreements. But if the evidence
establishes that the government intended to promote noncompetitive
pricing by ordering or explicitly tolerating facilitating practices, the
restraint should be considered hybrid. This result should follow even if the
government seeks to achieve some public goal by lessening price
competition. A state cannot, for example, justify an arrangement that
amounts to price fixing on the ground that it wants to inhibit consumption
of the product by increasing prices.
A restraint should not be deemed hybrid, thereby subjecting the
parties to further antitrust scrutiny and possibly the entry of an injunction
against compliance with or enforcement of the government directive,
merely because conduct contemplated by the state has some remote

202 Turner, supra note 169, at 675-76.
203 Id. at 676.
204 See id. at 676 ("Finally, in sharp contrast to the basic-price case, here a perfectly
understandable, plausible, and readily enforceable injunction can be written which would have
excellent prospects, in most cases, of making price behavior substantially more competitive.").
205 See POSNER, supra note 33, at 92 (arguing that evidence that the sellers agreed to
establish a basing-point system should be "unnecessary to establish a violation of the Sherman Act").
206 See, e.g., E.l.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
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potential of leading to tacit collusion. °7 Facilitating practices tend to be
competitively ambiguous, especially when compelled by a government
entity. We have mentioned a number of facilitating practices already:
basing-point pricing, the exchange of price information, and particularly
industry-wide resale price maintenance. But the list of facilitating practices
is not fixed; it expands as economic models and actual experience
demonstrate that particular conduct can be conducive to collusion. An
anticompetitive explanation could be offered for a wide variety of
government-imposed restraints, even some for which the competitively
benign justification seems compelling. Conversely, when a government
acts to bring about noncompetitive conduct and no significant and
plausible competitively-neutral explanation can be offered for the action,
the resulting restraint should be subjected to antitrust review. In such a
case, because the government at most is only mandating conduct that
facilitates collusion, the hybrid restraint will fail the requirements of state
action immunity for want of active supervision.
1.

Facilitating Practices and the Definition of Agreement

Our suggested definition of hybrid restraints applies to circumstances
in which there is no private agreement in the usual sense, only tacit
collusion. But, as we saw in the last section, the Supreme Court has
already extended the doctrine to reach conduct that is, at best, only
analogous to a private agreement. Fisher holds that competitors do not
conspire with each other just because they uniformly comply with a
specific legal requirement. Yet in Midcal and Duffy, the Court
characterized the restraint as resale price maintenance, even though the
dealers subject to the resale price mandates were merely complying with a
legal requirement. Moreover, the Court analogized the restraints in both
Schwegmann and Midcal to horizontal price fixing, even though
competing dealers charged identical prices only because the state required
them to charge the price determined by the supplier. Where a private actor
determines a price that the state enforces, the restraint is sufficiently
analogous to price fixing to justify invalidation.
It is no great extension of this reasoning to apply the concept of
hybrid restraints to state directives that facilitate tacit collusion, despite the
concept's problematic relationship to the law's standard definitions of
agreement. As we noted earlier, one of the reasons the Court condemned
the restraint in Duffy was that it increased the probability of collusion
among wholesalers by deterring cheating. Industry-wide resale price
207 Of course, if illegal collusion in fact takes place against the backdrop of the government
mandate, that collusion would be a private restraint, subject to antitrust liability.
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maintenance is thought to facilitate collusion among suppliers because it
reduces the incentive to shade the wholesale cartel price; as long as the
dealers adhere to the stipulated resale price, most of the gain from a
supplier cheating on the cartel price would inure to the dealer. 0 8 The
regulatory structure in Duffy not only encouraged suppliers to publicize
their prices, but it discouraged them from offering any secret discounts off
the wholesale prices they might have agreed to charge. In fact, because
government-mandated resale price restrictions typically apply industry
wide, there is a stronger economic objection to government-imposed resale
price restraints than to purely private resale price maintenance. Such a law
would increase the likelihood that competitors will make choices to raise
prices above the level that would otherwise prevail. But this interaction
among competitors, by itself, might not be considered concerted action
under the dominant approach to oligopolistic interdependence. As we have
seen in the last section, most courts hold that pure interdependent pricing
does not offend Section 1,209 so the statute does not necessarily facilitate
conduct that would otherwise be illegal. Nevertheless, as Duffy suggests,
the result may be a hybrid restraint because the non-competitive pricing
behavior may have been impossible absent the assistance of the state. The
state context alters the meaning of a horizontal agreement, just as it alters
the meaning of a vertical agreement, in identifying state-sponsored
restraints that conflict with antitrust rules.
2.

Anticompetitive Regulation with Facilitating Practices

We turn now to examples of state regulatory actions that were, we
believe, properly condemned as hybrid restraints on the ground that they
facilitated noncompetitive pricing. First, in a noteworthy group of cases
again arising in alcoholic beverage markets, courts have addressed state
"post and hold" statutes, which require liquor distributors to announce
price lists and to charge only those prices for as long as the list is in
effect.2t ° With one exception, the courts have invalidated the restraints.21 '
208
209

See generally POSNER, supra note 33, at 88.
See, e.g., Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988)

(noting that courts "have almost uniformly held, at least in the pricing area, that ... individual pricing
decisions (even when each firm rests its decision upon its belief that competitors will do the same) do
not constitute an unlawful agreement under section Iof the Sherman Act").
210
See Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1984). But see id. at
179 (Winter, J., dissenting). Without offering much analysis, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp
endorse the dissent's position on the ground that it is "more consistent with Midcal," given "the great
danger that agreements to post and adhere will facilitate horizontal collusion." I AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 308-09, 217b2.
211
See TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001); Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d
1344, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986); Beer & Pop Warehouse v. Jones, 41 F. Supp. 2d 552, 560-62 (M.D. Pa.
1999); Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan, 16 F. Supp. 2d 41,47-48 (D. Mass. 1998); AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Goodman, 745 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (M.D. Pa. 1990). The Jones case did not discuss
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In the most recent case in the series, TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer,2 ' 2 the Fourth
Circuit characterized Maryland's post-and-hold system, which also
prohibited volume discounts, as "a hybrid restraint that amounts to a per
se violation of § 1.,,214 The court reasoned that the post-and-hold and
volume discount restrictions were illegal per se, because, under Catalano,
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,2 Is the retailers would commit per se Section 1
violations by agreeing among themselves on similar restrictions.2 6
This reasoning is striking because nothing in the state's "post-andhold" scheme purported to authorize liquor wholesalers to agree on prices.
Nor did it impose resale prices set by wholesalers on dealers. The
arrangement, therefore, did not impose a price chosen by one firm on
another firm, like the state-mandated resale price maintenance schemes in
Midcal and Schwegmann. Instead, the law required each wholesaler to
adhere to its own prices. Nevertheless, the result is a sensible adaptation of
the law of facilitating practices to the context of state regulation. Under
conventional models of oligopoly behavior, the dissemination of
information about prices and a credible commitment to maintain those
prices reduce a firm's uncertainty about its rivals' pricing behavior and
thereby predictably foster a non-competitive outcome. 21 7 And whatever
criticisms can be leveled against the theory of oligopolistic
interdependence," 8 the evidence in the case arguably showed that the
restrictions in fact increased prices. 21 9 Equally important, the Maryland
hybrid restraints directly.
212 242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001).
213 Id. at 202-03. The court remanded for reconsideration of whether the Twenty-first
Amendment barred application of the Sherman Act. Id. at 213. The protection afforded anticompetitive
state regulation by the Twenty-first Amendment is beyond the scope of this Article.
214 Id. at 206.
215 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (holding an agreement among competitors not to extend trade credit
illegal per se).
216 TFWS,242 F.3dat209,210.
217 For example, in his classic article on the subject, Donald Turner emphasizes that an
imperfect oligopoly pricing pattern is converted into a perfect one "by eliminating uncertainties."
Turner, supra note 169, at 673; see also Carlton et al., supra note 199 (describing information-sharing
practices that can be anticompetitive in certain situations).
218 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 33, at 69 ("There is no sound basis in economic theory for
thinking that if there are just a few sellers in a market, competition will disappear automatically.")
(emphasis in original); Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 164, at 1566-71. See generally Lopatka, supra
note 173.
219 On remand for reconsideration of the defendant's Twenty-first Amendment defense, the
district court credited the testimony of one of the defendant's expert witnesses that the restrictions
"result in higher and more stable prices" than would otherwise exist. TFWS, Inc. v. Shaefer, 183 F.
Supp. 2d 789, 792 (D. Md. 2002), vacated, No. 02-1199, 2003 WL 1689528 (4th Cir. Mar. 31, 2003).
The expert testified that the anti-discrimination, or volume-discount, provision leads to higher prices in
two ways:
(1) by depriving a manufacturer or wholesaler of one important form of price
competition, i.e., the selective price reduction to a favored, usually larger, retailer,
which is used as a means of increasing market share; and (2) by reducing incentive
for retailers to conduct promotions and advertising, especially price-based
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legislature intended to induce non-competitive pricing.220 It apparently
believed that the obligations imposed on sellers would "promote[]
temperance by eliminating price wars among liquor wholesalers and by
maintaining wholesale prices at stable (and higher) levels.,

22 1

The state

expected the scheme to have anticompetitive effects through unconstrained
choices of private parties, and outcomes are more likely to occur when
they are intended than when they are inadvertent.22 2
By prohibiting certain unilateral conduct in which private parties
might otherwise have engaged, post-and-hold regulations limit the domain
of rivalry and thus increase the likelihood of an anticompetitive outcome
that private parties could not legally achieve by actual agreement. They
may facilitate tacit collusion, even though they do not explicitly authorize
any kind of collusion. Thus, federal courts could enjoin the appropriate
state officials from enforcing the regulations against private firms that rely
on the requirements to collude tacitly. Of course, if the sellers expressly
colluded after implementation of the regulatory scheme, then the relevant
restraint would be the subsequent agreement, a wholly private restraint,
and because it was not immune under Midcal for want of active
supervision, the actors would be liable for violating Section 223
promotions, since the wholesaler or manufacturer is precluded by law from
offering a rebate or allowance to reward or spur the higher volume that such a
promotion would bring.
Id.The expert concluded that the price filing requirement results in higher prices because it
tends (1)to reduce the opportunity for price competition by requiring that each
firm maintain its filed price list for a thirty-day period, and (2) to reduce the
incentive for price competition by revealing price cuts to competitors, since in the
absence of price filing, one of the incentives to a price reduction is the acquisition
of new customers during the period before competitors discover the price cut and
adjust their prices.
Id. at 792-93. The plaintiffs expert did not dispute the conclusion that the restrictions increase the
price of liquor, but argued that the price increase would not result in reduced consumption. See id. at
793-94. On appeal, the circuit court vacated summary judgment for the state, holding that the district
court was required to conduct a trial on the disputed question of whether the regulations in fact reduce
consumption. TWFS, 2003 WL 1689528, at *7.
220 The plaintiff on first remand argued that "Maryland's true purpose in enacting and
defending its statutory scheme is the protection of small retailers." Id. at 791 n.1.
Its expert argued that,
as a result, the system increased the number of retail outlets. Id. at 793. But the district court found that
the state's "avowed" purpose of promoting temperance controlled and that, in any event, the state
might have been motivated by both purposes. Id. at 791 n. I. Further, the scheme would not necessarily
result in more outlets because the state controlled the number of outlets through its licensing system.
Id. at 793.
221 TFWS, 242 F.3d at 203.
222 See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir.
1986).
223 A finding of a hybrid restraint in TFWS is consistent with Posner's view of tacit collusion
and can even be reconciled with Tumer's. The govemment orders the firms to engage in conductposting and adhering to prices-that encourages collusion, but the individual decisions to set supracompetitive prices are still not inevitable, and if the firms do set these prices, that coordination can be
called an unlawful agreement. The government effectively participates in a private anticompetitive
agreement. The restraint is hybrid, and punishing it as an antitrust violation will discourage conduct
that can be avoided. Under Tumer's view, pure interdependent pricing is beyond the reach of Section 1
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In some situations, a government may facilitate collusion not by
dictating the conduct of the colluding parties but by creating market
conditions that are propitious for tacit collusion.2 24 Though either kind of
government action may lead to an anticompetitive outcome, the critical
practical difference is that laws creating a hospitable climate for collusion
are more likely to be economically ambiguous than are directives to
engage in facilitating practices. It is one thing to thwart a mandate that has
little purpose other than to facilitate collusion, but it is another to inhibit a
government from taking action that may sensibly serve a legitimate public
interest, even if it may also create an environment favorable to tacit
collusion.
A particularly troublesome case along these lines is A.D. Bedell
Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc.. 22S which reviewed the multi-state
settlement of the massive tobacco litigation. To settle states' suits to
recoup healthcare costs and reduce smoking by minors,226 the four major
tobacco companies ("Majors"), accounting for ninety-eight percent of
cigarette sales in the United States, agreed to pay the states about $200
billion over twenty-five years2 27 Not only did the forty-six states signing
on to the Multistate Settlement Agreement ("MSA") promise to drop their
suits in exchange, 2 8 but the MSA contemplated financial penalties for any
participating fringe firm that increased its market share ,229 nonparticipating fringe firms, and new entrants. 230 Twenty fringe firms,
accounting for about two percent of the market, became Subsequent
Participating Manufacturers ("SPMs"). 231 An SPM owed nothing to the
settlement fund if it maintained its 1998 market share but owed a
substantial amount per pack if it increased its share. 232 States were given
an incentive to enact "Qualifying Statutes," which impose obligations on
any non-signatory tobacco company, including by definition all new
entrants, either to become a SPM, with the attendant financial obligations,
and when the government mandates facilitating practices, the firms' subsequent, interdependent
pricing can be called pure. But the primary reason for Tumer's hesitance to condemn pure tacit

collusion is the absence of an effective remedy. In the hybrid restraint context, this concern disappears,
because a court can order a public official not to enforce a state mandate to engage in a facilitating
practice.
224 In In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002), the
court observed that economic evidence of explicit collusion generally includes "evidence that the
structure of the market was such as to make secret price fixing feasible (almost any market can be
cartelized if the law permits sellers to establish formal, overt mechanisms for colluding .... .
Structural conditions are equally relevant to the prospects of tacit collusion.
225 263 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001).
226 Id. at 241.
227 Id. at 241-42.
228 Id. at 241 n.1.
229 See id. at 244.
230 See id. at 245.
231 Id. at 243.
232 Id. at 244.
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or to pay a "tax" into an escrow fund.233 The payments the Majors agreed
to make into the settlement fund in part reflected compensation for past
harm suffered by the states, and so prices set to cover those payments
would inevitably exceed the unregulated prices of an equally efficient new
entrant, which caused no past harm. 3 If new entrants took sales from the
Majors, the Majors would suffer financial injury, which might jeopardize
their payments to the states. 235 The provisions of the MSA and the
Qualifying Statutes were designed to "effectively and fully neutralize[] the
cost disadvantages that the Participating Manufacturers [would]
experience vis-a-vis Non-Participating Manufacturers. 23 6 Plaintiff
wholesalers claimed that the restrictions on expansion and new entry
"permitted the Majors to raise their prices to near monopoly levels," levels
"allegedly above those necessary to fund the settlement payments. '' 23 1

233 Id. at 246. Under the terms of the agreement, if a state does not enact a qualifying statute
and non-participating manufacturers gain market share, the Majors are permitted to reduce their
payments to the settlement fund by more than a proportionate amount. Id. at 244. The agreement
provides that a state's payment "shall not be subject to" such an adjustment if the state enacts a
qualifying statute. id. at 244 n.19. For a description of the provisions of the MSA designed to impede
new entry, see Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 381-82 (2000) (observing that the "agreement with the states contains a
diabolically clever set of provisions to insulate cigarette manufacturers" from competition from new
entrants).
234 One court explained that the amounts paid in settlement by the participating
manufacturers were intended to redress "past and future damages." Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278
F.3d 339, 351 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding in a challenge to the MSA and the Virginia qualifying statute
that the settlement does not violate due process, equal protection, the Commerce Clause, or the
Compact Clause). By contrast, "nonparticipating members are required to put money into escrow
which is held only for assuring that the nonparticipating manufacturers'future liability is satisfied." /d.
(emphasis added). The court apparently accepted the plaintiff's assertion that, "while all of the
payments made by nonparticipating manufacturers under the [Virginia] qualifying statute are used to
pay for future harms caused to the Commonwealth, only five percent of the payments made by
participating manufacturers go to addressing future harms." Id. at 353 (emphasis in original).
235 As one court explained:
Because of a concern that manufacturers participating in the Master Settlement
Agreement might suffer a competitive disadvantage when compared to
nonparticipating manufacturers and that this disadvantage could affect the
participating manufacturers' ability to make the settlement payments, the Master
Settlement Agreement includes provisions to protect the market shares and
profitability of the participating manufacturers.
Id. at 345-46.
236 Bedell, 263 F.3d at 246 (quotation marks omitted). As the court explained:
Together, the Renegade Clause, the Qualifying Statutes and the Enforcement Fund
allegedly create severe obstacles to market entry, or to increasing production and
market share. This is not accidental. The Multistate Settlement Agreement
explicitly proclaims its purpose to reduce the ability of non-signatory cigarette
manufacturers to seize market share because of the competitive advantage accruing
from not contributing to the settlement.
Id. (citation omitted).
237 Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the Majors could have funded the settlement by a price
increase of $0.19 per pack, but the Majors instituted two price increases totaling $0.76 per pack. 1d.
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238
The Third Circuit held that the "case resembles a hybrid restraint.,
It then applied the Midcal analysis, concluding that, though the MSA
represented a clear state policy to displace competition,2 39 it failed to
provide for adequate supervision. 240 The court, however, did find the
defendants' activities in reaching the settlement immune under the NoerrPennington doctrine,24' which protects from antitrust liability good faith
efforts by private actors to secure anticompetitive government actions.242
Nothing in the MSA or the Qualifying Statutes explicitly authorized
the Majors to set prices jointly. If a state had authorized express collusion,
the restraint would certainly have been hybrid and subject to Midcal.
Indeed, though the plaintiffs alleged that the Majors violated Section 1,
they apparently did not claim that the Majors explicitly colluded on
prices. 24 ' Rather, they based their allegation of an agreement on the MSA
itself, which obviously is an agreement but did not authorize any further
express collaboration.2 44 The best anticompetitive story that can be told is
that the states intentionally created a zone of pricing freedom that the
Majors could exploit through pricing interdependence. Hence, the scheme
allegedly allowed the Majors to increase the market price of cigarettes by
$76 per pack, when an increase of $.19 per pack would have been enough
to satisfy their obligation to the states.245 Unlike post-and-hold statutes, the
state restrictions fostered tacit collusion by constraining the conduct of
fringe and potential competitors, or stated otherwise, by limiting entry and
expansion. But in both contexts, the resulting market prices were expected
to be non-competitive, allegedly the result of unconstrained private
decisions.24 6
238 Id. at 258 (internal quotation marks omitted).
239 Id. at 260 ("[lit is evident that the Multistate Settlement Agreement was backcd by
clearly articulated state policy.").
240 Id. at 262. The court noted, "[W]e are not convinced that the States satisfy Midcal's
'active supervision' prong. This is because the States' supervision does not reach the parts of the
Multistate Settlement Agreement that are the source of the antitrust injury." Id. The provisions of the
MSA providing for regulation "have no effect on pricing or production and thus do not regulate the
challenged anticompetitive conduct." Id. at 264.
241 ld. at 254.
242 For a description of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see supra note 83.
243 Tellingly, the court did not find that the MSA authorized the manufacturers to collude,
but rather that it "empowers the tobacco companies to make anticompetitive decisions with no
regulatory oversight by the States." Bedell, 263 F.3d at 260 (emphasis added).
244 Id. at 241.
245 Id. at 246.
246 Interestingly, the Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
509 U.S. 209 (1993), rejected the argument that cigarette manufacturers could use tacit collusion to
recoup the losses incurred in a campaign of predatory pricing. The Court described tacit collusion as a
process "not in itself unlawful," id. at 227, thereby endorsing the Turner view. Nor did the Court find
tacit collusion a sufficient basis for inferring that oligopolists will be able to recoup losses from a
predatory pricing campaign. See id. at 227-28. Bedell, however, implicitly relied on the prospect of
enhanced tacit collusion to condemn an unsupervised, state-sponsored arrangement. The difference
between the two cases lies in the government context. However unlikely tacit collusion is in the
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Cases like TFWS and Bedell hint at the danger of extending the
concept of a hybrid restraint to government-mandated facilitating
practices. If any government directive that facilitates non-competitive
behavior is called a hybrid restraint, states may be unduly constrained in
their regulatory choices. A wide range of common government regulations
could potentially be termed hybrid under this definition and thus trigger
antitrust liability unless protected by the state action doctrine. Immunity
would require not only active supervision but a clear policy articulated by
the state as sovereign authorizing the regulatory scheme.
Of course, a successful antitrust challenge based on governmentsupported facilitating practices requires a theory as to how the conduct in
question does indeed facilitate collusion. Sometimes, a restraint can be
deemed unilateral for want of a plausible theory. For example, reconsider
Massachusetts Food Association v. Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages
Control Commission,24 7 where the state law provided that "no one can own
more than three retail liquor stores" in the state.24 8 It is difficult to
construct a theory as to how the three-store limit facilitates collusion,
unless the state severely restricts the number of owners as well as the
number of outlets; indeed, the law may hinder collusion by reducing
concentration.
In other cases, the theory explaining the anticompetitive potential of a
restraint may be tenuous. Recall that in Hostetter, for example, the
restraint included a requirement that liquor dealers charge prices in New
York no higher than the lowest price at which they made sales anywhere
else in the country during the preceding month. 249 As a matter of theory,
most-favored-nation clauses may indicate collusion, 250 but they may also
increase efficiency.2 5 ' Thus, the arrangement would fail our standard.
Also, under this reasoning, the Second Circuit erred in Hertz Corp. v. City
unregulated context following a predatory campaign, it is far more likely where the state intrudes to
inhibit rivalry. The Brooke Group Court identified the threat of expansion by fringe firms and new
entrants as sources of instability for tacit arrangements, but these are precisely the activities the states
sought to inhibit in Bedell.
247 197 F.3d 560 (1st Cir. 1999).
248 Id. at 562. Ironically, the Supreme Court in Rice, in emphasizing the lack of
anticompetitive potential of the California designation statute, noted that the statute did not limit the
"number of importers which may be designated by the distiller." Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458
U.S. 654, 662 (1982). The Massachusetts scheme did indeed limit the number of retail outlets a single
dealer could own. But the observation in Rice was intended to show that the restriction at issue was
even less suspect than it might have been, not that a restriction on the number of distributors would be
invalid under the antitrust laws.
249 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1966).
250 See George A. Hay, Facilitating Practices: The Ethyl Case, in THE ANTITRUST
REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 194-95 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J.

White eds., 3d ed. 1999).
251 See, e.g., Keith J. Crocker & Thomas P. Lyon, What Do "FacilitatingPractices"
Facilitate? An Empirical Investigation of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts, 37
J.L. & ECON. 297 (1994).
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of New York,252 when it held that a New York City ordinance prohibiting
rental car companies from imposing fees based on a person's residence
"merits hybrid treatment. 2 53 The restraint unilaterally limited firms'
ability to make differential charges and did not, by any theory now
recognized, encourage collusive behavior. But so long as a plausible
theory can be articulated predicting a risk of tacit collusion, the restraint
will be suspect.
More importantly, though, the theory supporting the anticompetitive
potential of some restraints is robust. For example, because pricing
interdependence requires that a market have no more than a few sellers,25 4
any government-imposed scheme restricting the right to operate to a small
number of suppliers, without a concomitant specification of price, could
easily be termed hybrid. Thus, a state might permit only six firms to
provide limousine service at an airport without setting rates.255 The
potentially enormous scope of the facilitation approach to defining hybrid
restraints, therefore, is troublesome. The concern, however, should not be
overstated. First, a court can derive some information on the capacity of a
restraint to facilitate collusion from the identity of the complainants. If the
sellers who pose the risk of collusion object to the restraint, as the
landlords did in Fisher, the restraint is almost certainly not facilitating
collusion, and it can be adjudged unilateral. Second, a restraint is hybrid
only if it results in private collusion; Fisher makes clear that states are free
to dictate prices. For this reason, a state or municipal agency limiting the
number of limousine service providers at an airport may typically specify
rates as well, and the result would be a unilateral restraint. We have no
empirical estimate of the number of governmental restraints that in fact
facilitate collusion.
More significantly, states have the full range of police powers and can
act to advance health, safety, and welfare in ways that have an ancillary
effect on competition. They have a greater range of justifications for
regulations that limit competition than would private competitors in
regulating their own behavior. Our approach is deferential: where the
government mandates or specifically authorizes individual conduct that
significantly facilitates collusive pricing by private competitors, the
arrangement should be considered a hybrid restraint unless the government
252 1F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1993).
253 Id. at 127. The court concluded that the "law is not a 'unilateral' restraint," though it does
not "easily fit the fact pattern of the cases held to involve 'hybrid' restraints" either. Id.
254 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 33, at 68-69 (noting that "concentration is a necessary
condition of tacit collusion"); Turner, supra note 169, at 661 (noting that interdependent behavior
"might well arise in an 'oligopoly' situation (i.e., where sellers are 'few')").
255 In Commuter TransportationSystem, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 801
F.2d 1286, 1288 (1 Ith Cir. 1986), the state agency restricted the number of limousine service providers
to six, but it had contracts with them that presumably contained price terms.
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directive serves an appreciable and plausible competitively-benign
purpose. Thus, a law limiting the number of limousine companies serving
an airport might plausibly be justified by concerns about congestion or
safety of passengers. Similarly, a state law requiring stores to close at a
certain time each day would not be a hybrid restraint, even though the
stores themselves could not legally agree on a fixed closing time. 256 A
statutory closing time might reduce competition along one dimension and,
conceivably, could affect price or output; but it would be difficult to
characterize the restraint as primarily aimed at facilitating noncompetitive
behavior, because the state's justifications are likely to be plausible and
appreciable (under a properly deferential standard). Although some laws
limiting entry or expansion, like the one in Bedell, may be primarily
designed to facilitate noncompetitive pricing, that kind of law is bound to
be unusual.
Moreover, intent evidence is useful in identifying hybrid restraints. In
both Bedell and TFWS, for example, the state intended to permit private
parties to price less competitively. Usually, evidence of intent is of limited
utility in antitrust cases. 57 Firms are not adept at expressing their
intentions artfully, and vigorous competition implies an intent to injure a
rival anyway. But when the government intends to permit firms to behave
non-competitively, one inference is that, all else equal, non-competitive
behavior is more likely to result. Another inference is that the law is not
designed to achieve public purposes unrelated to collusion. Stated
otherwise, government directives that are intended to facilitate collusion
are likely to be unambiguous. This is not to say, however, that a
government's statement of intent should be taken as irrefutable evidence of
the regulation's purpose. Legislators commonly express a benign purpose
in order to mask its real desire to transfer wealth. In an appropriate case, if
the explicit statement of intent is demonstrably specious, it ought to be
disregarded. By contrast, absent any demonstrable intent on the part of
government to facilitate collusion, a restriction on the number of firms in a
market that can be explained as an attempt to reduce traffic congestion or
pollution might be deemed unilateral, even if higher prices result.

256 See Mass. Food Ass'n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 197 F.3d 560,
565 (1 st Cir. 1999).
257 See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401-03 (7th
Cir. 1989); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338-39 (7th Cir. 1986);
Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379-80 (7th Cir. 1986); Barry
Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983).
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V.

Private Monopolies and Hybrid Restraints

.. In the preceding part, we focused on the prospect of collusive
behavior. The private discretion that is required for a hybrid restraint in
that context pertains to the ability of competitors to price interdependently.
But suppose a state confers a monopoly on a firm and allows it to price
without regulatory constraints. Would the entry restrictions inherent in the
creation of the monopoly suffice to render the scheme a hybrid restraint?
Under our analysis, the answer is no. The goverment-protected
monopolist has the requisite discretion for a hybrid restraint, but its
conduct is not closely analogous to behavior that violates Section 1. For a
monopolist simply to charge monopoly prices resembles no recognized
Section 1 offense.
For example, in Arsberry v. Illinois, 258 state correctional authorities
granted telephone companies exclusive rights to provide telephone service
in each prison and jail in return for fifty percent of the revenues
generated. 259 According to Judge Posner, because the state is a monopolist
with "iron control over access to the inmate market," it does not violate the
antitrust laws by renting "pieces of the market to different phone
companies. 2 60 The court concluded that "[s]tates and other public
agencies do not violate the antitrust laws by charging fees or taxes that
261
exploit the monopoly of force that is the definition of government.,
Furthermore, "the persons with whom the states contract [do not] violate
the antitrust laws by becoming state concessionaires, provided those
persons do not collude among themselves or engage in other
anticompetitive behavior, of which charging high prices as a state
concessionaire is not a recognized species." The rates charged by the
phone companies were apparently not specified in the contracts conferring
exclusive rights. The rates were contained in tariffs filed with federal and
state regulatory agencies, 262 but conceivably the agency's supervision of
those rates was not sufficiently active to pass muster under Ticor.
Nevertheless, the presence or absence of state action immunity is beside
the point. Even if each telephone company had been granted a degree of
pricing discretion, the arrangement would not conflict with the antitrust
laws as a hybrid restraint because the conduct does not resemble an
antitrust violation.

258
259
260
261
262

244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.).
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 561.
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Now consider Electrical Inspectors, Inc. v. Village of East Hills.263
Pursuant to state authority, municipalities gave a private, not-for-profit
firm the exclusive right to conduct inspections of new buildings for
compliance with the electrical code but did not regulate the fees the firm
charged to homeowners and electricians. 264 A for-profit competitor
challenged the scheme, seeking damages against the firm and equitable
relief against the cities. The district court held that the cities and the
exclusive inspector were entitled to state action immunity, concluding that
the cities satisfied the clear state policy requirement, that the cities'
immunity extended to the inspector, and that active supervision was not
required. 265 The circuit court reversed on the ground that active
supervision of the inspector was required for the inspector's own
immunity 66 and perhaps for the cities' immunity as well, 267 and it
remanded for an inquiry into supervision. 268 Though neither court
considered it, the unilateral restraint doctrine, in our view, could have
disposed of the bulk of the claim, rendering consideration of the state
action doctrine unnecessary. To the extent the plaintiff challenged the
inspector's monopoly pricing, the restraint was not hybrid, both because
the conduct was not analogous to an antitrust violation and because the
justification for the restraint was plausible and appreciable.269 One town
asserted that "it would not be in the best interests of the village (and its
residents) or building owners to have more than one qualified agency
performing services because additional inspectors 'would result in loss of
control ... over the electrical inspection process and the quality of the end

result.' ' 270 The argument that competition in the electrical inspection
services market would be inefficient-and here threaten public safety-is
263 320 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2003).
264 Elec. Inspectors, Inc. v. New York Bd. of Fire Underwriters, 145 F. Supp. 2d 271, 275
(E.D.N.Y. 2001), vacated sub noin. Elcc. Inspectors, Inc. v. Village of East Hills, 320 F.3d 110 (2d
Cir. 2003).
265
266

Elec. Inspectors, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 278-279.
Elec. Inspectors, 320 F.3d at 128.

267 Id. at 129.
268 Id.
269 The plaintiff seemingly tried to avoid alleging that the charging of a monopoly price
alone exposed the inspector to antitrust liability, see id. at 127, but its allegation that the firm abused its
monopoly "by providing low-quality service," id.at 116, amounted to the same thing. The relevant
economic concept is quality-adjusted price, here a monopoly quality-adjusted price. The mere
exploitation of monopoly power is not an antitrust violation. But the plaintiff also asserted that the
inspector violated the antitrust laws by "threatening to retaliate in those locations where it has
exclusivity against customers who use the plaintiff's services where competition is allowed." Id. at
116. Such conduct may even have been sufficiently remote from the municipal regulatory scheme as to
be a private restraint. Otherwise, it was hybrid and subject to state action immunity analysis. The
plaintiff's final claim, that the inspector "attempted to monopolize inspections services by seeking
government-issued exclusivity," id. at 128, clearly alleged private conduct, but conduct that almost
certainly enjoyed Noerr-Pennington immunity.
270 Elec. Inspectors, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (quoting Affidavit of Frank B.Falco
1],17).
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not compelling, though this kind of argument has stronger legs when made
by a municipality with no financial interest in limiting competition than
when asserted by private competitors who agree to limit rivalry.27 And the
justification does not directly explain why the villages did not set the price.
But under a deferential standard of review, the restraint is unilateral.272
We have been arguing that a state-granted monopoly coupled with
pricing discretion does not constitute a hybrid restraint and, for that reason,
does not conflict with Section 1 of the Sherman Act. But the Fisher Court
alluded to the possibility that a unilateral restraint imposed by government
may violate Section 2. In a footnote, the Court wrote:
Though they have not pressed the point with any vigor in this Court,
appellants have suggested that Berkeley's rent controls constitute
attempted monopolization because the city 'is clearly engaged in the
provision of housing in the public sector' and using the controls to
depress the prices of residential properties as a prelude to taking them
over. As to this claim, we note only that the inquiry demanded by
appellants' allegations goes beyond the scope of the facial challenge
presented here.273
A violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, of course, does not require
concerted action. Therefore, the fact that a restraint is unilaterally imposed
by government does not imply a lack of conflict with this statutory
provision. But the logic that drives the distinction between hybrid and
unilateral restraints for purposes of identifying a conflict with Section 1
applies equally here. A state mandate does not conflict with antitrust
unless it authorizes or facilitates conduct analogous to an antitrust
violation, regardless of its effect on consumer welfare.
Section 2 outlaws exclusionary conduct-conduct that injures
competition and does not increase efficiency-that either results in
monopoly power or poses a dangerous probability of resulting in such
271 Cf Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978) (rejecting a
justification for an agreement by engineers not to engage in competitive bidding that competition
"would lead to deceptively low bids, and would thereby tempt individual engineers to do inferior work
with consequent risk to public safety and health").
272 In In re Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, I10 F.T.C. 549 (1988), the FTC
suggested a somewhat related interpretation of Fisher: If the governmental body imposing the restraint
consists of individuals with separate economic identities and a financial interest in the regulation, then
any restraint imposed by it cannot be unilateral. The FTC concluded that members of the state
optometry board engaged in a combination when they acted together to impose a restriction on truthful
advertising. We doubt that the status under Fisher of an otherwise unilateral restraint depends on the
composition of the government agency. The principle in any event would have limited applicability. It
would not apply, for instance, to a typical public utilities commission, whose members by law must be
disinterested. Further, the FTC would be hard pressed to extend the principle to a city council, even if
its part-time members economically benefitted from an ordinance as commercial actors.
273 Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 270 n.2 (1986) (citations omitted).
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power. For the completed offense of monopolization, for example, the
plaintiff must show "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident., 274 To prove attempted
monopolization, the plaintiff must show "that (1) the defendant has
engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent
to monopolize.2 7 5 The law does not prohibit the mere possession and use
of monopoly power, 276 and with good reason. The prospect of monopoly
profits can be the carrot that prompts firms to innovate and thereby
improve the lot of consumers. Section 2 is premised on the assumption that
the benefits flowing from this dynamic process outweigh the static
inefficiency caused by monopoly pricing.
In general, government-granted monopolies are not acquired through
exclusionary conduct within the meaning of the law. Petitioning
government for the monopoly may not be socially productive, but it is
separately protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 277 The
government's action in granting the monopoly may or may not be socially
productive, and if it is, the reason may have little to do with encouraging
innovation. But, in any case, it has no counterpart in the law of
exclusionary conduct developed under Section 2. Similarly, the
exploitation of the monopoly by charging higher prices does not satisfy the
conduct element of Section 2. For example, in Endsley v. City of
Chicago,278 the court rejected the claim that a city violated Section 2 by
raising tolls on a highway, noting that simply raising prices is not itself
anticompetitive. Similar logic would apply in the context of a simple grant
of a state monopoly to a private firm-the firm's action in raising prices
would not be exclusionary. Thus, to the extent the complaint in Electrical
Inspectors alleged that monopoly pricing by the government-designated
exclusive inspector violated Section 2,279 it should fail for want of
exclusionary conduct. In short, a unilateral restraint imposed by
government that results in the exploitation of monopoly power by a private
274 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
275 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 447 (1993).
276 As noted in Marshfield Clinic,
A natural monopolist that acquired and maintained its monopoly without excluding
competitors by improper means is not guilty of "monopolizing" in violation of the
Sherman Act and can therefore charge any price that it wants for the antitrust laws
are not a price-control statute or a public-utility or common-carrier rate-regulation
statute.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412-13 (7th Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted).
277 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
278 230 F.3d 276, 283 (7th Cir. 2000).
279 See Elec. Inspectors, Inc. v. Village of East Hills, 320 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2003)
(referring to a Section 2 allegation).
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firm lacks the close analogy to a Section 2 violation necessary for a
conflict between the government action and the antitrust statute.28 ° Such a
restraint avoids antitrust condemnation regardless of state action
immunity.
Conclusion
Because state and local governments regulate economic activity in
myriad ways, tension with federal antitrust policy is inevitable. The Court
has developed a sophisticated doctrine of state action immunity to resolve
conflicts between the federal antitrust laws and state policies. But state
action immunity need be considered only when there is a real conflict. The
Court has attempted to identify conflicts by distinguishing between hybrid
restraints, which do conflict with antitrust law, and restraints unilaterally
imposed by government, which do not. But its guidance has been cryptic.
We have offered a more comprehensive approach to unilateral
governmental and hybrid restraints. Under our approach, a unilateral
governmental restraint is one in which public officials determine the nature
and extent of the resulting consumer injury, even though the decision is
effectuated through the actions of private parties in compliance with the
government's mandates; a hybrid restraint is one in which the government
specifically empowers private actors to exercise discretion as to the nature
or level of consumer injury in a way that is closely analogous to an
antitrust violation. Properly applied, this doctrine works in tandem with the
doctrine of state action immunity to isolate and remove from further
antitrust scrutiny governmental actions that do not reflect a naked
repudiation of antitrust.

280 We confine our comments to situations in which the government merely regulates the
conduct of private parties. State and local governments instead may function as market participants. As
a matter of substantive law, a defendant cannot violate Section 2 unless it competes in the market that
it is monopolizing or attempting to monopolize. E.g., Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 93 F.3d 1055,
1062 (2d Cir. 1996), revd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 128 (1998); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v.
FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 925-27 (2d Cir. 1980). To conflict with Section 2, therefore, a state or local
govemment must at a minimum be engaged in a commercial enterprise. If a governmental entity acting
in a proprietary capacity engages in exclusionary conduct that is commercial in nature, the analogy to
private Section 2 violations is much closer than when the government merely regulates, and the
argument that the government's action conflicts with the antitrust laws is therefore much stronger. If
the entity protects its proprietary interests through exclusionary conduct that is governmental in nature,
the analogy is tenuous, but there is an arguable conflict with Section 2. We note the issue here, but a
full exploration of it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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